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Abstract 
Anorexia  nervosa  (AN)  is  a  deadly  disorder  characterized  by  the  persistence  of  
dangerous  behaviors  (e.g.,  dietary  restriction)  even  when  deleterious  health  outcomes  
occur.  Despite  this,  our  understanding  of  factors  that  promote  and  maintain  such  
rigidity  is  lacking.  The  current  paper  proposes  a  model  suggesting  that  rigid  behaviors  
in  AN  can  be  formulated  as  maladaptive  rule-­‐‑governed  behavior  (RGB)  that  emerges  in  
situations  of  uncertainty,  such  as  in  the  presence  of  affective  arousal.  An  empirical  study  
examining  differences  in  RGB  between  individuals  weight-­‐‑recovered  from  AN  (AN-­‐‑
WR)  and  healthy  controls  (CN)  in  neutral  and  stressful  situations  is  described.  Seventy-­‐‑
four  adults  (AN-­‐‑WR:  36;  CN:  38)  were  randomized  to  undergo  either  a  stressful  or  
neutral  mood  manipulation  and  then  completed  a  laboratory  assessment  of  RGB,  the  
Wisconsin  Card  Sorting  Test  (WCST),  along  with  questionnaires  assessing  degree  of  
uncertainty  experienced  during  the  WCST  and  general  intolerance  of  uncertainty.  While  
the  mood  manipulation  did  not  significantly  impact  WCST  performance  in  either  group,  
the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  demonstrated  significantly  more  total  correct  items  but  a  greater  
number  of  perseverative  errors  than  the  CN  group.  Furthermore,  these  outcomes  were  
related  to  greater  levels  of  uncertainty  experienced  during  the  task  along  with  general  
fears  of  uncertainty.  Results  provide  support  for  using  the  frame  of  maladaptive  RGB  in  
as  a  model  of  rigidity  in  AN  and  may  explain  why  dangerous  behaviors  continue  even  
when  health  consequences  emerge.  These  findings  extend  our  current  knowledge  of  
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rigidity  in  AN  and  suggest  that  targeting  difficulties  with  uncertainty  may  be  an  
important  treatment  component  needed  in  interventions.  
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1. Introduction  
Anorexia  nervosa  (AN)  is  a  severe  and  poorly  understood  psychiatric  disorder  
characterized  by  restriction  of  energy  intake  leading  to  a  significantly  low  body  weight,  
intense  fear  of  weight  gain,  and  disturbance  in  the  way  the  body  is  experienced  
(American  Psychological  Association,  2013).  As  the  leading  cause  of  disability  and  
mortality  among  psychiatric  illnesses,  including  a  57-­‐‑fold  risk  of  death  by  suicide  (Keel  
et  al.,  2003),  the  medical  and  psychological  impact  of  the  disorder  is  remarkable.  Despite  
the  serious  nature  of  AN,  our  understanding  of  disorder  etiology  and  maintenance  
remains  limited,  as  exemplified  by  the  current  absence  of  effective  treatments  for  adults  
(Bodell  &  Keel,  2010).    
Those  with  AN  are  characterized  as  extremely  ritualized  and  perfectionistic  
individuals  who  have  difficulty  adapting  to  change  (Kaye,  Wierenga,  Bailer,  Simmons,  
&  Bischoff-­‐‑Grethe,  2013;  Strober,  1980).  These  individuals  rigidly  adhere  to  verbally  
formulated  rules  and  routines  despite  the  presence  of  negative  outcomes,  such  as  occurs  
with  the  relentless  adherence  to  dietary  rules  even  in  the  face  of  death.  Furthermore,  
rigid  and  inflexible  behaviors  seem  to  predate  illness  onset  and  continue  post  recovery  
(Strober,  1980;  Tchanturia  et  al.,  2004).  An  enhanced  understanding  of  this  core  
phenomenology  may  lend  important  insight  into  the  development  of  novel  
interventions.    
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This  paper  will  propose  that  rigid  behaviors  in  AN  can  be  formulated  as  
maladaptive  rule-­‐‑governed  behavior  (RGB)  that  emerges  in  contexts  of  uncertainty,  such  
as  in  the  presence  of  affective  arousal.  An  overview  of  RGB  will  first  be  presented  using  
findings  from  the  human  operant  laboratory.  A  model  of  maladaptive  RGB  will  then  be  
described  and  discussed  as  a  way  to  understand  rigid  behaviors  in  AN  with  a  rationale  
suggesting  that  rigidity  may  be  intensified  in  the  presence  of  affective  arousal.  Emerging  
findings  from  the  neurocognitive  literature  will  be  interpreted  as  evidence  of  the  
proposed  model.  Following  this,  an  empirical  study  with  aims  to  characterize  RGB  in  
AN  and  explore  the  influence  of  affective  arousal  will  be  presented  and  findings  
discussed.    
1.1 RGB:  An Overview 
Using  a  model  of  maladaptive  RGB  to  formulate  rigidity  in  AN  requires  an  
understanding  of  how  one  acquires,  adheres,  and  updates  verbal  rules  in  accordance  
with  feedback  from  the  environment.  The  study  of  verbal  rule-­‐‑learning  and  thus  RGB  is  
vast  and  a  complete  review  is  beyond  the  scope  of  the  current  paper.  A  basic  
introduction  of  RGB  will  be  provided  followed  by  several  important  findings  from  the  
operant  laboratory  that  have  direct  implications  for  AN.  
1.1.1 RGB Versus Contingency-Based Behavior 
Behavior  can  be  determined  by  verbal  antecedents  (i.e.,  RGB)  and/or  
environmental  contingencies  (contingency-­‐‑based  behavior;  Cantania,  Shimoff,  &  
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Matthews,  1989).  According  to  Skinner  (1969)  “rules”  reflect  a  class  of  verbal  statements  
that  describe  contingencies  of  reinforcement  or  punishment.  Rules,  therefore,  include  
instructions,  advice,  policies,  and  commands  in  addition  to  verbal  contingencies  
specifically  labeled  as  “rules”  (Skinner,  1969).  While  rules  include  the  internalization  of  
external  guidance  from  others  (e.g.,  “Don’t  touch  the  stove”)  they  also  can  be  self-­‐‑
generated  and  have  similar  effects  on  behavior  (Baumann,  Abreu-­‐‑Rodrigues,  &  da  Silva  
Souza,  2009;  Rosenfarb,  Newland,  Brannon,  &  Howey,  1992).  As  such,  from  a  behavioral  
perspective,  any  behavior  modulated  by  verbal  antecedents  is  classified  as  “rule-­‐‑
governed”  (Hayes,  Thompson,  &  Hayes,  1989).  In  contrast,  contingency-­‐‑shaped  
behavior  reflects  behavior  that  develops  and  persists  or  ceases  as  a  consequence  of  
variable  environmental  factors.  The  distinction  of  RGB  and  contingency  based  behavior  
is  important  given  these  determinants  of  behavior  show  different  patterns  of  acquisition  
and  extinction  as  will  be  discussed  below.    
Verbal  learning  and  contingency-­‐‑based  learning  can  generate  similar  behavioral  
responses.    For  example  (see  Cantania,  1997),  one  can  rapidly  learn  that  a  stove  should  
not  be  touched  through  a  mother’s  verbal  instruction  of  “Do  not  touch  the  stove  as  it  
will  burn  you”  (RGB).  This  can  also  be  learned  via  direct  experience  as  the  individual  
feels  the  heat  intensity  increase  as  her  hand  gets  closer  to  the  stove  (contingency-­‐‑shaped  
behavior).    Each  type  of  learning  has  different  patterns  of  acquisition  and  extinction  with  
unique  advantages  and  limitations.  RGB  and  contingency-­‐‑based  behavior  are  therefore  
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more  or  less  adaptive  depending  upon  the  situation.      
The  acquisition  of  RGB  is  faster  than  contingency-­‐‑based  behavior  (Catania,  1997).  
For  example,  it  will  take  a  novice  baker  far  less  time  to  make  cookies  by  following  
instructions  than  by  trial  and  error.  Without  such  verbal  rules,  the  novice  baker  would  
have  to  use  environmental  contingences  as  a  guide  (e.g.,  when  I  bake  the  cookies  at  this  
temperature  they  are  undercooked,  but  when  I  bake  them  at  this  temperature  they  
burn).  Verbal  rules  therefore  quickly  transfer  the  experience  of  one  individual  (e.g.,  
professional  baker)  to  another  (e.g.,  novice  baker)  without  the  need  for  direct  contact  
with  the  contingencies.  Such  rapid  acquisition  can  be  advantageous  when  contact  with  
the  environmental  contingences  would  be  burdensome  and  lengthy  (e.g.,  baking  
chocolate  chip  cookies  for  the  first  time),  impair  safety  (e.g.,  cutting  yourself  with  a  knife  
can  be  dangerous  or  even  deadly),  or  when  feedback  from  contingencies  is  distal  (e.g.,  
one  cannot  contact  the  negative  impact  of  current  smoking  on  the  lungs  until  many  
years  later).  Thus,  it  is  especially  adaptive  to  quickly  acquire  new  behaviors  in  particular  
situations.    
While  the  acquisition  of  RGB  occurs  more  rapidly  than  contingency-­‐‑based  
behavior,  verbally  ascribed  behavior  is  less  sensitive  to  changing  environmental  
contingencies  (Hayes  &  Gifford,  1997).  That  is,  a  behavioral  response  under  the  control  
of  verbal  rules  is  slower  to  extinguish  with  the  removal  of  reinforcement.  Thus,  even  
when  consequences  change,  the  response  persists  (e.g.,  continuing  to  bake  cookies  at  a  
     5  
  
certain  temperature  in  accordance  with  the  “rule”  even  though  the  cookies  keep  
burning).  Termed  the  insensitivity  effect  (Catania,  1997),  behavior  acquired  through  
verbal  rules  may  continue  even  when  maladaptive.    
Contingency-­‐‑based  behavior,  on  the  other  hand,  is  more  sensitive  to  changing  
conditions  and  extinguishes  more  quickly  upon  the  removal  of  reinforcement  (e.g.,  
adjusting  the  temperature  at  which  one  bakes  cookies  rather  than  continuing  to  bake  
them  with  a  temperature  at  which  they  have  previously  burned).  This  sensitivity  to  
contingencies  is  often  necessary  in  the  presence  of  a  changing  environment  and  certainly  
for  the  moment-­‐‑to-­‐‑moment  changes  of  internal  experience.  For  example,  the  behaviors  
of  initiating  and  stopping  feeding  most  adaptively  follow  changes  in  internal  experience  
(e.g.,  hunger  and  satiety).    
In  sum,  rule-­‐‑based  and  contingency-­‐‑based  behavior  show  unique  patterns  of  
acquisition  and  extinction.  Responses  controlled  by  verbal  rules  are  faster  to  develop  
and  therefore  are  essential  in  specific  situations.  However,  RGB  is  slower  to  adapt  to  
changes  in  environmental  contingencies  and  responses  may  persist  even  when  
maladaptive  (i.e.,  insensitivity  effect).  In  contrast,  contingency-­‐‑based  behavior  emerges  
through  a  history  of  interaction  with  the  environment  and  thus  is  slower  to  develop  but  
faster  to  extinguish  when  responses  are  no  longer  reinforced.  Some  responses  cannot  be  
verbally  guided  and  thus  learning  necessitates  direct  learning  experiences.    
While  there  are  predictable  patterns  associated  with  RGB  versus  contingency-­‐‑
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based  learning,  human  behavior  is  complex  and  includes  the  integration  of  rules  and  
shaped  behavior.  A  rigid  reliance  on  either  mode  of  learning  would  lead  to  maladaptive  
outcomes  outside  of  specific  contexts  under  which  they  are  effective  (e.g.,  baking  the  
cookies  at  a  specific  temperature  may  often  work  and  is  therefore  adaptive;  however,  
always  baking  cookies  at  that  temperature  even  when  using  an  oven  of  lower  wattage  
would  not  be  effective  and  would  represent  an  overreliance  on  rules  to  the  neglect  of  
important  contextual  variables).      
1.1.2 The Insensitivity Effect 
   Verbal  rules  have  been  found  to  induce  the  insensitivity  effect  by  1)  precluding  
sufficient  contact  with  environmental  contingencies  and  2)  by  blunting  the  effectiveness  
of  experiential  contact  that  does  occur  (Hayes,  Brownstein,  Zettle,  &  Rosenfarb,  1986;  
Hayes  &  Gifford,  1997).  Work  conducted  in  the  operant  laboratory  by  Hayes  and  
colleagues  demonstrates  this  lack  of  responsiveness  to  contingencies  in  the  presence  of  
verbal  rules  (Hayes  et  al.,  1986).  In  this  study,  participants  were  asked  to  move  a  light  
through  a  matrix  by  pushing  a  button  during  three  separate  32-­‐‑minute  sessions.  
Participants  were  informed  that  two  different  signal  lights  indicated  the  schedule  of  
reinforcement  (i.e.,  a  green  light  signaled  one  to  “go  fast”  indicating  a  fixed  ratio  
schedule  and  a  red  light  to  “go  slow”  reflecting  a  differential-­‐‑reinforcement  of  low-­‐‑rate-­‐‑
schedule).  The  instruction  lights  were  no  longer  illuminated  after  the  first  session  for  
half  of  the  participants.  Individuals  were  randomized  to  one  of  three  conditions,  which  
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differed  by  the  pattern  of  signal  light  illumination.  In  two  of  the  conditions,  only  one  
signal  light,  either  the  green  light  (“go  fast”  condition)  or  the  red  light  (“go  slow”  
condition),  was  exclusively  illuminated  during  the  experiment.  In  the  third  condition,  
illumination  of  the  signal  lights  alternated  between  each  other  at  one-­‐‑minute  intervals  
(“go  fast/go  slow”  condition).    Unbeknownst  to  the  participants,  the  actual  experimental  
reinforcement  schedule  alternated  between  a  fixed  ratio  schedule  and  a  differential-­‐‑
reinforcement  of  low-­‐‑rate  schedule  every  two  minutes.  As  such,  the  signal  lights  were  
accurate  only  50%  of  the  time  in  each  of  the  conditions.  If  instructions  were  followed  in  
either  the  “go  fast”  or  “go  slow”  condition,  then  participants  would  have  learned  only  
one  of  the  responses  that  successfully  moved  the  light  through  the  matrix.  However,  
individuals  in  the  other  condition  were  instructed  to  produce  multiple  responses  in  
accordance  with  two  lights  that  illuminated  at  different  times.  These  participants  should  
have  learned  that  both  pushing  the  button  rapidly  and  pushing  the  button  slowly  at  
times  resulted  in  the  successful  movement  of  the  light  through  the  matrix  if  they  
followed  the  instructions.      
Overall,  participants  followed  the  instructions  of  their  respective  condition  even  
when  doing  so  interfered  with  successfully  moving  the  light  through  the  matrix  
(indicating  rule-­‐‑based  insensitivity).  However,  when  the  instruction  lights  were  no  
longer  activated,  a  different  pattern  emerged.  Individuals  in  the  “go  fast/go  slow”  
condition  immediately  exhibited  behavior  consistent  with  the  experimental  
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reinforcement  schedule.  That  is,  once  the  instruction  lights  were  no  longer  illuminated,  
these  individuals  rapidly  demonstrated  alternating  behavioral  responses  in  accordance  
with  the  reinforcement  contingencies  and  successfully  moved  the  light  through  the  
matrix.  The  authors  suggest  this  indicates  that  the  insensitivity  effect  was  promoted  via  
the  instructions,  or  rules,  initially  exerting  control  over  the  behavioral  responses  instead  
of  the  actual  reinforcement  contingences.  They  argue  that  this  may  have  been  promoted  
by  a  history  of  rule-­‐‑following  mediated  by  social  contingencies  (i.e.,  the  experimenter’s  
instructions).  An  inaccurate  understanding  of  the  reinforcement  contingencies  was  
unlikely  given  they  quickly  responded  adaptively  after  the  instruction  lights  were  
removed.  The  participants  in  the  “go  fast”  condition  or  the  “go  slow”  condition,  
however,  demonstrated  continued  adherence  to  their  instructions  even  in  the  absence  of  
the  signal  lights.  This  indicates  that  the  instructions  precluded  full  contact  with  the  
reinforcement  contingencies.  That  is,  because  of  the  instructions,  these  individuals  only  
learned  that  one  behavioral  response  moved  the  light  through  the  matrix.  This  response  
was  only  successful  half  of  the  time  and  learning  other  responses  would  have  been  more  
adaptive.  The  instructions  therefore  interfered  or  prevented  these  individuals  from  
emitting  other  behavioral  responses  and  they  therefore  failed  to  learn  that  another  
response  was  successful  at  moving  the  light  through  the  matrix  the  rest  of  the  time.    
Although  more  empirical  data  are  needed,  individual  differences  may  enhance  
the  insensitivity  effect.  Wulfert  and  colleagues  (1994)  examined  the  correspondence  
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between  self-­‐‑reported  rigidity  and  rule-­‐‑governed  insensitivity  to  changing  
contingencies.  They  hypothesized  that  individuals  classified  as  “rigid”  would  more  
likely  have  a  history  of  experiencing  a  stronger  reinforcement  pattern  for  rule  following.  
As  such,  their  learning  history  would  generate  RGB  even  when  following  rules  was  
ultimately  maladaptive  (Wulfert,  Greenway,  Farkas,  &  Hayes,  1994).  A  similar  paradigm  
as  described  above  was  implemented  comparing  individuals  classified  as  either  “rigid”  
or  “not  rigid”  using  extreme  scores  on  an  index  of  self-­‐‑reported  rigidity.  Individuals  
either  received  “minimal”  instructions  indicating  they  would  receive  points  for  moving  
a  marker  through  a  matrix  or  “accurate”  instructions  in  which  they  were  also  informed  
that  the  specific  color  of  a  signal  light  corresponded  with  the  best  way  to  push  the  
button  (e.g.,  “fast  pushes”  work  best  when  the  light  is  blue).  After  two  behavioral  
acquisition  sessions,  an  unannounced  extinction  session  followed  during  which  the  
marker  ceased  any  movement  and  no  longer  responded  to  any  type  of  button  push.      
As  expected,  higher  scorers  on  the  rigidity  scale  predicted  greater  behavioral  
persistence  during  the  extinction  period  despite  the  change  in  the  reinforcement  
schedule.  That  is,  individuals  classified  as  “rigid”  continued  to  engage  in  pushing  the  
button  despite  a  lack  of  movement  by  the  marker.  Furthermore,  while  behavioral  
persistence  was  more  pronounced  in  the  accurate  instruction  condition,  there  was  also  
evidence  of  persistent  behavior  among  those  who  received  minimal  instructions  and  
therefore  these  individuals  continued  to  follow  even  the  minimal  rule  of  “push  the  
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button”  despite  the  absence  of  any  reinforcement.  Findings  demonstrate  that  rigidity  
may  in  fact  be  an  individual  difference  factor  that  is  associated  with  enhanced  rule-­‐‑
governed  insensitivity  as  “rigid”  individuals  failed  to  adapt  to  the  changing  
environmental  contingencies.      
1.1.3 Summary 
In  sum,  basic  research  from  the  operant  laboratory  supports  several  important  
features  of  RGB.  First,  RGB  can  foster  the  rapid  acquisition  of  behavioral  responses,  
which  may  promote  adaptive  behavior  more  quickly  than  would  contingency-­‐‑based  
behavior.  Second,  RGB  can  enhance  insensitivity  to  changing  environmental  
contingencies  via  insufficient  contact  with  feedback  necessary  for  effective  adjustment  of  
behavior,  reducing  the  effect  contact  with  the  contingencies  does  have,  and  individual  
difference  factors  including  rigidity.  As  such,  behavior  that  once  was  adaptive  may  
persist  despite  an  alteration  in  reinforcement  schedules  and  this  may  be  more  likely  
among  individuals  with  particular  temperaments  or  trait  features.  Third,  rule-­‐‑following  
has  the  same  impact  on  behavior  whether  derived  from  an  external  source  or  is  self-­‐‑
generated.    
1.2 Rigidity in AN as Maladaptive RGB 
A  model   informed   by   findings   from   the   operant   laboratory   will   propose   that  
rigid  behaviors   in  AN  can  be  conceptualized  as  maladaptive  RGB.  It  will  be  suggested  
that  an  intolerance  of  uncertainty  and  the  need  for  control  promotes  an  overreliance  on  
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RGB  among  individuals  with  AN  in  uncertain  situations.  It  will  then  be  argued  that  the  
consequences  of  RGB  promote  a  self-­‐‑maintaining  system  of  rigid  behaviors  in  AN.  The  
application   of   the   proposed   model   to   the   rigid   adherence   of   dietary   rules   will   be  
provided.  Following   this,   a   rationale   suggesting   that   rigidity  may  be   intensified   in   the  
presence  of  affective  arousal  will  be  presented.  
1.2.1 Maladaptive RGB in AN: A Proposed Model 
Individuals  with  AN  are  often  characterized  by  a  fear  of  uncertainty  and  a  need  
for  control  (Konstantellou  &  Reynolds,  2010;  Merwin  et  al.,  2011;  Piech,  Hampshire,  
Owen,  &  Parkinson,  2009;  Schmidt  &  Treasure,  2006;  Sternheim,  Konstantellou,  Startup,  
&  Schmidt,  2011).  Individuals  with  AN  report  that  the  experience  of  uncertainty  is  
highly  aversive  and  necessitates  behavioral  strategies  (e.g.,  scheduling)  as  a  means  to  re-­‐‑
establish  control  (Sternheim  et  al.,  2011).  One  individual  from  a  recent  qualitative  study  
described  her  experience  of  uncertainty  as  “…feeling  very  out  of  control  and  it  forces  the  
need  to  have  some  certainty  and  predictability  and  the  need  for  that  gets  transferred  into  
day  to  day  having  routines,  structure  and  lots  of  mental  organizing  and  worrying  about  
this  and  trying  to  problem  solve  because  that  means  you  have  some  control  over  a  very  
certain  life  and  world”  (Sternheim  et  al.,  2011,  p.  19).    
It  is  proposed  that  the  fear  and  need  for  control  in  the  presence  of  uncertainty  
drives  an  overreliance  on  rules,  which  are  positively  and  negatively  reinforced,  even  
when  they  may  ultimately  be  maladaptive.  First,  the  reliance  on  rules  is  thought  to  
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initially  work  as  an  effective  strategy  as  it  results  in  positive  outcomes  (i.e.,  it  works).  
Additionally,  and  importantly,  rules  may  provide  a  sense  of  predictability  and  control  
by  reducing  the  aversive  experience  of  uncertainty.  However,  such  rule-­‐‑following  
would  be  expected  to  increase  insensitivity  to  changes  in  environmental  contingencies-­‐‑  
and  thus  not  extinguish  even  in  the  absence  of  continued  reinforcement  or  when  
negative  outcomes  occur.  
The  reliance  on  verbal  rules  may  also  interfere  with  the  individual  learning  
alternative  behaviors  that  may  be  more  effective  or  conducive  to  valued  living.  The  
failure  to  learn  other  ways  to  cope  with  uncertainty  outside  of  rule-­‐‑following  would  
subsequently  promote  the  continued  reliance  on  rules  to  guide  behavior.  This  may  
occur,  even  when  the  individual  receives  (and  contacts)  feedback  that  the  response  is  
ineffective,  as  the  individual  has  not  learned  alternative  ways  to  respond  and  feels  that  
rules  are  the  solution.  A  self-­‐‑perpetuating  cycle  is  therefore  proposed  with  rigidity  in  
AN  formulated  as  maladaptive  RGB  (see  Figure  1).  
The  application  of  the  model  to  dietary  rules  provides  an  illustration  of  the  onset  
and  maintenance  of  rigidity  using  the  above  formulation.  It  has  long  been  demonstrated  
that  individuals  with  AN  use  dietary  rules  to  control  weight  and  shape  (Steinglass  et  al.,  
2011;  Sysko,  Walsh,  Schebendach,  &  Wilson,  2005).  Dietary  needs  for  weight  
management  depend  on  various  uncontrollable  and  unknown  factors  such  as  
metabolism  and  energy  expenditure.  Relying  on  the  body  to  determine  nutritional  needs  
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and  regulate  weight  is  likely  to  be  too  risky  for  these  individuals  who  desire  certainty  
and  demand  perfection  (Bastiani,  Rao,  Weltzin,  &  Kaye,  1995;  Frank  et  al.,  2012;  Halmi  et  
al.,  2000;  Srinivasagam,  Kaye,  Plotnicov,  &  Greeno,  1995;  Sternheim  et  al.,  2011).  As  such,  
dietary  rules  (e.g.,  “I  must  not  eat  more  than  600  calories  per  day”)  would  presumably  
manage  the  uncertainty  associated  with  the  amount  an  individual  should  eat  to  lose  
weight  by  reinstating  a  sense  of  control  and  attenuating  the  uncomfortable  emotional  
and  physiological  correlates  of  this  feared  state  (e.g.,  rapid  heartbeat,  churning  stomach).  
This  would  be  much  preferred  to  using  feedback  from  the  body  (e.g.,  hunger  and  satiety  
cues)  to  continually  assess  one’s  nutritional  needs,  as  this  is  an  uncertain  strategy  with  
the  potential  for  weight  gain.    
Following  implementation  of  the  dietary  prescriptive  of  only  600  calories  per  
day,  the  individual  would  receive  feedback  regarding  the  successfulness  of  this  rule.  
Presumably  with  this  calorie  reduction  the  result  would  be  weight  loss  (positive  
reinforcement).  While  the  rule  is  effective  as  it  led  to  weight  loss,  the  reliance  on  the  rule  
as  a  guide  for  behavior  would  lead  to  responses  that  persist  even  when  the  
contingencies  change.  As  such,  the  adherence  to  the  dietary  rules  would  be  expected  to  
continue  even  in  the  presence  of  negative  outcomes  (e.g.,  dangerously  low  weight),  as  
the  individual  is  insensitive  to  feedback.  Furthermore,  the  individual  would  become  
insensitive  to  the  very  stimuli  needed  to  adaptively  regulate  eating  (i.e.,  hunger  and  
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satiety  cues),  which  would  require  the  continued  reliance  on  dietary  rules  to  guide  
eating.    
Importantly,  the  adherence  to  dietary  rules  would  prevent  the  individual  from  
learning  other  more  adaptive  ways  to  regulate  eating  and  cope  with  the  experience  of  
uncertainty.  As  such,  even  if  the  individual  is  able  to  contact  the  reality  of  dangerous  
health  consequences,  she  would  not  have  access  to  alternative  coping  strategies,  such  as  
practicing  accepting  the  experience  of  uncertainty  and  using  bodily  cues  to  guide  eating.  
She  would  therefore  need  to  rely  on  the  known  and  predictable  strategy  of  dietary  
restriction,  which  would  further  perpetuate  dietary  rigidity.    
Figure  1:  A  Proposed  Model  of  Maladaptive  RGB  in  Anorexia  Nervosa  
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1.2.2 Maladaptive RGB in AN: The Presence of Affective Arousal 
In  her  classic  work  examining  the  spectrum  of  abnormal  eating,  Bruch  (1961)  
argued  that  a  core  and  common  deficit  in  interoceptive  awareness  was  the  source  of  
aberrant  eating  patterns.  Bruch  suggested  that  both  obese  individuals  who  engaged  in  
overeating  and  underweight  and  emaciated  individuals  who  engaged  in  severe  
restriction  evidenced  impairments  in  interoceptive  awareness—awareness,  
identification,  and  responsiveness  to  internal  physiological  and  emotional  states  (Bruch,  
1961).  A  lack  of  interoceptive  accuracy  may  promote  confusion  over  current  
physiological  and  emotional  states.  In  support  of  this,  a  substantial  body  of  work  has  
shown  elevated  levels  of  alexythymia  (i.e.,  difficulty  identifying  and  labeling  emotional  
states)  in  individuals  with  AN  (Bourke,  Taylor,  Parker,  &  Bagby,  1992;  Cochrane,  
Brewerton,  Wilson,  &  Hodges,  1993;  Schmidt,  Jiwany,  &  Treasure,  1993).  As  such,  these  
individuals  demonstrate  difficulties  distinguishing  between  hunger,  satiety,  and  
affective  states  making  the  “best”  course  of  action  highly  uncertain  (Bruch,  1961).    
Furthermore,  individuals  with  AN  find  emotional  experience  distressing  
(Haynos  &  Fruzzetti,  2011).  It  has  been  shown  that  individuals  with  AN  perceive  and/or  
experience  emotions  more  intensely  (Merwin  et  al.,  2013;  Zucker  et  al.,  2013),  
demonstrate  higher  levels  of  emotional  reactivity  compared  to  controls  (Uher  et  al.,  2004;  
Zonnevylle-­‐‑Bender  et  al.,  2005),  and  struggle  with  emotion  regulation  (Harrison,  
Sullivan,  Tchanturia,  &  Treasure,  2009;  Harrison,  Sullivan,  Tchanturia,  &  Treasure,  2010;  
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Merwin  et  al.,  2013).  These  individuals  therefore  not  only  find  affective  experience  
distressing,  but  they  also  struggle  to  find  healthy  ways  to  regulate,  or  control,  their  
emotions.  This  may  perpetuate  uncertainty  and  a  loss  of  control  over  their  internal  
experience.    
It  is  hypothesized  that  RGB  and  consequent  rule-­‐‑based  insensitivity  in  AN  is  
likely  to  emerge  and  intensify  in  the  context  of  heightened  affect,  a  presumed  state  of  
significant  uncertainty  for  these  individuals.  Following  the  model,  rules  may  arise  as  a  
way  to  reinstate  predictability  and  control  over  internal  experience.  This  view  would  be  
commensurate  with  theoretical  models  positing  AN  as  a  disorder  of  emotion  
dysregulation  with  symptoms  used  as  a  means  to  control  affective  experience  (Harrison  
et  al.,  2009;  Haynos  &  Fruzzetti,  2011;  Merwin  et  al.,  2011;  Schmidt  &  Treasure,  2006).  
That  is,  AN  symptoms,  such  as  the  rigid  adherence  to  dietary  rules,  are  thought  to  
compensate  for  emotion  regulation  difficulties  (Haynos  &  Fruzzetti,  2011;  Merwin  et  al.,  
2011).  Predictions  from  this  would  imply  that  in  a  state  of  heightened  affect,  those  with  
AN  would  become  increasingly  rule-­‐‑governed  and  thus  insensitive  to  changing  
environmental  contingencies  resulting  in  behavioral  rigidity  even  when  maladaptive.  
1.2.3 Summary 
A  model  formulating  behavioral  rigidity  in  AN  as  maladaptive  RGB  has  been  
presented.  It  has  been  proposed  that  rigid  behaviors  will  increase  in  the  presence  of  
uncertainty,  such  as  during  states  of  affective  arousal,  and  that  this  rigidity  reflects  rule-­‐‑
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based  insensitivity  and  a  failure  to  learn  alternative  adaptive  responses.  Rule-­‐‑based  
insensitivity  may  therefore  explain  why  the  dangerous  behaviors  seen  in  AN,  such  as  
dietary  restriction,  persist  even  in  the  face  of  deleterious  health  outcomes.  
1.3 Maladaptive RGB in AN: Evidence from Neurocognitive 
Deficits 
1.3.1 Set-Shifting Deficits as Rule-Based Insensitivity and Inflexibility 
The  neurocognitive  analysis  of  set-­‐‑shifting  provides  the  greatest  empirical  
support  for  behavioral  rigidity  in  AN.  Impaired  set-­‐‑shifting,  or  the  ability  to  move  back  
and  forth  between  cognitive  and  behavioral  sets,  has  been  demonstrated  among  
individuals  currently  ill  with  AN,  recovered  from  AN,  and  among  nonaffected  sisters  of  
AN  probands  using  various  laboratory  tasks  (e.g.,  Roberts,  Tchanturia,  &  Treasure,  2010;  
Steinglass,  Walsh,  &  Stern,  2006;  Tchanturia  et  al.,  2004).  Such  findings  have  led  to  the  
postulation  of  impairments  in  cognitive-­‐‑behavioral  flexibility  as  a  potential  
endophenotype  (Friederich  &  Herzog,  2011;  Treasure,  2007;  Zastrow  et  al.,  2009).    
Various  laboratory  tasks  have  been  used  to  examine  set-­‐‑shifting  in  AN;  however,  
the  Wisconsin  Card  Sorting  Task  (WCST;  Berg,  1948)  is  one  of  the  most  widely  used  
tasks  and  continually  demonstrates  robust  effects  (Roberts  et  al.,  2010;  Tchanturia  et  al.,  
2012).  Importantly,  the  WCST  is  a  rule-­‐‑based  task  that  requires  the  acquisition  and  
implementation  of  a  derived  rule  along  with  the  ability  to  shift  to  a  new  rule  when  given  
feedback  that  this  behavioral  response  is  no  longer  adaptive  or  “correct.”  While  different  
laboratory  tasks  have  shown  set-­‐‑shifting  deficits  during  the  actively  ill  state,  the  WCST  
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continues  to  demonstrate  deficits  post-­‐‑recovery.  Evidence  from  this  comes  from  one  of  
the  largest  studies  on  set-­‐‑shifting  to  date,  which  implemented  a  battery  of  tests  assessing  
set-­‐‑shifting  ability  including  the  WCST,  the  Brixton  Task,  the  Trail  Making  Test,  and  
Haptic  Illusion  (Roberts  et  al.,  2010).  The  sample  of  270  individuals  included  those  who  
currently  met  criteria  for  AN  or  had  a  past  AN  diagnosis  but  had  been  weight  restored  
for  at  least  one  year  and  were  absent  of  eating  disorder  symptoms,  along  with  healthy  
controls  and  other  eating  disordered  groups.  Interestingly,  while  those  with  a  current  
AN  diagnosis  evidenced  deficits  in  set-­‐‑shifting  across  the  majority  of  tasks,  individuals  
recovered  from  AN  demonstrated  deficits  exclusively  on  the  WCST,  though  to  a  lesser  
degree  than  their  actively  symptomatic  counterparts.    
It  is  important  to  note  that  not  all  studies  have  found  set-­‐‑shifting  deficits  post-­‐‑
recovery  using  the  WCST  (Nakazato  et  al.,  2009),  though  this  study  included  a  sample  of  
only  18  recovered  individuals.  While  a  couple  studies  have  found  evidence  that  set-­‐‑
shifting  deficits  are  captured  in  other  non-­‐‑rule  based  tasks  post  recovery  (Tchanturia  et  
al.,  2004;  Tenconi  et  al.,  2010),  findings  across  studies  demonstrate  the  most  support  for  
the  WCST  (Tchanturia  et  al.,  2012;  Tenconi  et  al.,  2010).  For  example,  Tchanturia  and  
colleagues  administered  the  WCST  to  a  sample  of  542  participants  (including  90  
individuals  recovered  from  AN).  Continued  set-­‐‑shifting  deficits  were  again  found  
among  individuals  post  recovery,  but  as  in  Roberts  et  al.  (2010),  to  a  lesser  degree  than  
those  in  the  acute  stage  of  illness.    
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The  Brixton  Spatial  Task  (Burgess  &  Shallice,  1997)  is  also  a  rule-­‐‑based  task.  It  is  
not  surprising,  however,  that  Roberts  and  colleagues  (2010)  did  not  find  set-­‐‑shifting  
deficits  post-­‐‑recovery  using  this  task,  findings  which  have  been  replicated  using  a  large  
sample  of  72  individuals  in  long-­‐‑term  recovery  from  AN  (Tchanturia  et  al.,  2011).  The  
Brixton  Spatial  Task,  unlike  the  WCST,  explicitly  instructs  participants  that  their  derived  
rules  will  change.  In  other  words,  individuals  are  given  a  higher  order  rule.  Thus,  
individuals  with  AN  may  be  more  successful  in  this  task  as  the  task  is  not  ambiguous  
and  following  this  higher  order  rule  would  actually  lead  to  positive  outcomes.  Such  
findings  are  consistent  with  other  studies  that  have  demonstrated  that  individuals  
currently  ill  with  AN  did  not  differ  from  healthy  controls  on  a  set-­‐‑shifting  task  when  
provided  overt  instructions,  but  performed  significantly  worse  when  instructions  were  
ambiguous  and  a  higher  order  rule  was  not  given  (Pignatti  &  Bernasconi,  2013).    
Taken  together,  the  WCST  largely  and  almost  exclusively  continues  to  
demonstrate  set-­‐‑shifting  deficits  in  AN  post  recovery.  Such  findings  potentially  reflect  
that  the  WCST  may  be  better  able  to  capture  set-­‐‑shifting  deficits,  and  perhaps  an  
underlying  source  of  such  difficulties,  that  continues  outside  of  the  ill  state.  Unlike  most  
other  set-­‐‑shifting  tasks,  the  WCST  is  an  ambiguous  rule-­‐‑based  task.  Furthermore,  other  
rule-­‐‑attainment  tasks  that  explicitly  provide  instructions  of  a  higher  order  rule  do  not  
evidence  continued  deficits  among  individuals  with  AN  after  recovery.  Thus,  one  
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hypothesis  is  that  the  behavioral  tendency  to  perseverate  in  AN,  as  demonstrated  by  set-­‐‑
shifting  deficits  on  the  WCST,  may  in  part  be  explained  by  rule-­‐‑based  insensitivity.    
The  WCST  requires  individuals  to  sort  cards  consisting  of  different  combinations  
of  three  variables:    shape,  color,  number.  Upon  presentation  of  a  target  card  (e.g.,  two  
red  crosses),  the  participant  is  asked  to  sort  the  card  into  one  of  four  stacks  that  each  
have  a  different  face  card  (e.g.,  one  red  circle,  two  green  stars,  three  blue  squares,  or  four  
yellow  crosses).  The  target  card  can  match  three  of  the  face  cards  on  different  criteria.  At  
any  instance  there  are  thus  different  potential  ways  in  which  the  card  can  be  correctly  
sorted.  For  example,  the  target  card  could  be  correctly  sorted  into  the  stack  with  the  red  
circle  face  card  as  they  both  share  the  same  color,  the  stack  with  the  four  yellow  crosses  
face  card  as  they  share  the  same  shape,  or  the  stack  with  two  green  stars  as  they  share  
the  same  number.  The  participant  is  given  no  additional  instructions  other  than  to  sort  
the  cards  and  is  provided  with  feedback  as  to  whether  or  not  each  card  was  sorted  
correctly.  Unbeknownst  to  the  participant,  the  predetermined  sorting  rule  changes  
throughout  the  task  providing  an  index  of  perseveration  (i.e.,  continuing  to  sort  in  
accordance  with  a  previous  rule  despite  feedback  that  the  rule  is  incorrect;  perseverative  
errors)  and  therefore  rule-­‐‑based  insensitivity.  The  task  is  completed  after  the  sorting  of  
128  cards  with  categorical  rules  changing  after  10  cards  are  correctly  sorted  in  
accordance  with  the  rule.  The  number  of  categories  completed  indicates  the  number  of  
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rules  the  individual  successfully  employs,  which  requires  the  ability  to  successfully  
acquire,  maintain,  and  adjust  rules  in  response  to  changing  contingencies.      
The  WCST  requires  the  capacity  to  implement  hypothesis  testing  to  derive  a  rule  
(acquisition)  and  then  continuing  to  update  behavior  in  accordance  with  changing  
contingencies.    This  requires  one  to  stop  behavioral  responses  following  a  rule  that  was  
once  effective  but  is  no  longer  effective  (extinction).  Additionally,  this  also  requires  one  
to  adaptively  implement  rules  and  corresponding  behavior  in  response  to  changing  
contingencies  (flexibility).  For  example,  a  once  successful  rule  may  no  longer  be  effective  
after  a  contingency  change  but  may  again  be  effective  after  a  later  contingency  change.  
Thus,  successful  outcomes  require  the  flexible  application  of  rules.    
Studies  consistently  demonstrate  impairments  in  set-­‐‑shifting  in  AN  as  
operationalized  by  a  greater  amount  of  perseverative  errors,  with  some  studies  also  using  
number  of  completed  categories  relative  to  healthy  control  individuals  (Roberts,  
Tchanturia,  Stahl,  Southgate,  &  Treasure,  2007;  Roberts  et  al.,  2010;  Steinglass  et  al.,  
2006).  Such  findings  may  also  be  interpreted  as  rule-­‐‑based  insensitivity  and  inflexible  
RGB  respectively.  That  is,  perseverative  errors  provides  an  index  of  rule-­‐‑based  
insensitivity  as  it  measures  the  continued  implementation  of  a  rule  that  is  no  longer  
successful  due  to  changing  contingencies  (i.e.,  the  number  of  times  an  individual  
continues  to  sort  a  card  based  on  a  previously  successful  rule  that  is  now  “wrong”).  The  
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number  of  completed  categories  would  provide  a  measure  of  rule  flexibility  as  it  
encompasses  the  ability  to  acquire,  maintain,  extinguish  and  change  rules  adaptively.    
While  WCST  findings  suggest  maladaptive  RGB  in  AN,  other  outcomes  further  
characterizing  rule  acquisition,  extinction,  and  flexibility  have  either  not  been  assessed  
or  are  have  not  been  commonly  been  reported.  Identifying  the  parameters  of  RGB  will  
allow  for  the  isolation  of  specific  maladaptive  response  patterns  and  thus  guide  novel  
intervention  development  in  AN  (see  Figure  2  for  a  diagram  of  potential  maladaptive  
response  patterns  and  Table  1  for  a  description  of  current  and  proposed  WCST  
outcomes  reflecting  these  parameters).    
Describing  rigidity  at  the  level  of  neurocognition  provides  one  important  way  
from  which  to  understand  AN  behaviors.  However,  formulating  rigidity  in  terms  of  
contextual  variables  (e.g.,  reinforcement  contingencies)  may  complement  these  more  
biologically  based  explanations  and  allow  for  the  advancement  of  CBT  interventions.  
  
                            Figure  2:  Potential  Maladaptive  RGB  Response  
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Table  1:  WCST  Outcomes  
WCST Score Description Rule-Learning Component 
Rule Rate Accuracy* Number of cards sorted before 
an accurate rule is 
implemented (lower scores = 
faster acquisition). 
Acquisition rate of accurate 
rule in the 1st category. 
# of Trials to Complete 1st 
Category 
Number of cards sorted before 
first rule change including the 
10 cards that must be 
accurately and consecutively 
sorted (lower scores = faster 
acquisition) 
Rate of acquisition and ability 
to maintain behavior (i.e., 
follow an adaptive rule) 
Total # Perseverative Errors Number of responses sorted in 
accordance with a previously 
correct rule that is now 
incorrect  (higher scores = 
greater rule-based 
insensitivity) 
Ability to adaptively 
extinguish behavior and by 
extension rule-based 
insensitivity across the task 
# Perseverative Errors in 2nd 
Category* 
Number of perseverative 
errors during the 2nd category       
(higher scores = greater rule-
based insensitivity) 
Ability to adaptively 
extinguish behavior and by 
extension rule-based 
insensitivity after first and 
presumably most unexpected 
contingency change 
# Categories Completed Number of times a rule was 
accurately detected and 
maintained for 10 consecutive 
sorts (higher scores = greater 
flexibility) 
General ability to acquire and 
flexibly adjust and implement 
rules in accordance with 
changing contingencies 
(flexibility) 
Total Correct Total number of cards 
correctly sorted (higher scores 
= greater flexibility) 
General ability to acquire and 
flexibly adjust and implement 
rules in accordance with 
changing contingencies 
(flexibility) 
Note. Rule implementation is defined as sorting consecutive cards in accordance with the same rule (e.g., 
color).    
* Indicates a novel WCST score. 
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1.3.2 Affective Arousal and Neurocognition 
To  date,  the  influence  of  affective  arousal  on  RGB  outcomes  has  not  been  
examined.  Set-­‐‑shifting  deficits  have  been  associated  with  anxious  and  depressive  
symptoms  in  AN  (Giel  et  al.,  2012;  Roberts  et  al.,  2010),  but,  to  our  knowledge,  an  
experimental  paradigm  inducing  mood  state  has  not  been  conducted.  Previous  
laboratory  work  with  healthy  controls  has  demonstrated  improvements  in  
neurocognition  including  cognitive  flexibility  after  positive  mood  inductions,  but  
negative  mood  inductions  have  not  been  shown  to  influence  outcomes,  though  
laboratory  work  is  notably  sparse  (see  Mitchell  &  Phillips,  2007  for  a  review).  However,  
previous  work  has  demonstrated  that  cognitive  flexibility  is  influenced  by  motivational  
factors  (e.g.,  hunger)  in  healthy  controls  (Piech  et  al.,  2009),  suggesting  that  cognitive  
functioning  can  be  negatively  impacted  by  internal  states.        
There  is  some  evidence  that  negative  mood  states  impair  neurocognition  in  
clinical  populations  (Graver  &  White,  2007;  Mitchell  &  Phillips,  2007;  Ravnkilde  et  al.,  
2002).  For  example,  a  recent  laboratory  study  investigated  the  impact  of  psychosocial  
stress  on  neuropsychological  functioning  in  individuals  with  social  phobia  and  healthy  
controls  (Graver  &  White,  2007).  Stress  was  induced  by  informing  participants  that  they  
would  be  videotaped  while  they  completed  a  battery  of  neurocognitive  tasks.  
Furthermore,  they  were  informed  that  this  tape  would  be  used  as  a  training  video  for  
“hundreds  of  expert  clinicians.”  Psychosocial  stress  was  found  to  negatively  impact  
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neuropsychological  functioning,  but  exclusively  among  those  struggling  with  social  
anxiety.    
Taken  together,  the  investigation  of  negative  mood  manipulations  on  acute  and  
sustained  cognitive  performance  is  limited,  in  general,  with  even  less  investigation  in  
AN.  The  work  examining  the  influence  of  a  negative  mood  induction  on  cognitive  
outcomes  has  not  found  evidence  for  impairment  among  healthy  controls  (see  Mitchell  
&  Phillips,  2007)  although  there  is  evidence  that  motivational  factors  can  negatively  
impact  cognitive  functioning  (Piech  et  al.,  2009).  Furthermore,  albeit  limited,  previous  
work  has  shown  that  affective  arousal  negatively  impacts  cognitive  functioning  in  
clinical  populations  (Graver  &  White,  2007).    
1.3.3 Summary 
In  sum,  evidence  from  the  neurocognitive  literature  suggests  that  rule-­‐‑based  
insensitivity  and  impaired  flexibility  may  be  one  way  to  interpret  set-­‐‑shifting  deficits  in  
AN.  This  formulation  may  explain  inconsistent  findings  across  neurocognitive  
laboratory  tasks  employed  after  recovery.  That  is,  the  continued  detection  of  set-­‐‑shifting  
deficits  in  AN  after  recovery  primarily  with  the  WCST,  a  rule-­‐‑following  task,  suggests  
that  aberrant  rule-­‐‑following  may  account  for  these  differences  in  outcomes.    
Importantly,  although  the  literature  is  small,  the  findings  that  set-­‐‑shifting  deficits  
continue  in  AN  post  recovery,  although  to  a  lesser  degree  than  their  actively  ill  
counterparts,  suggest  that  maladaptive  rule-­‐‑following  is  not  exclusively  a  result  of  
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starvation  (Roberts  et  al.,  2007;  Tchanturia  et  al.,  2012;  Tchanturia  et  al.,  2011;  Tenconi  et  
al.,  2010).  Additional  research  further  characterizing  maladaptive  RGB  in  AN  and  
determining  the  contexts  in  which  this  behavior  is  strengthened  outside  of  the  state  of  
starvation  is  needed.  Although  a  negative  mood  induction  has  not  been  found  to  impair  
cognitive  functioning  in  healthy  control  individuals  (Mitchell  &  Phillips,  2007),  some  
work  suggests  it  has  an  impact  in  clinical  populations  (Graver  &  White,  2007)  and  little  
is  known  about  the  influence  in  AN.  Exploration  of  the  impact  of  affective  arousal  on  
RGB  in  AN  may  aid  our  understanding  of  factors  that  influence  the  onset  and  
maintenance  of  rigid  behaviors.        
1.4 Current Study 
1.4.1 Study Rationale 
The  previous  section  argued  that  rigid  behaviors  in  AN  can  be  formulated  as  
maladaptive  RGB.  A  model  suggesting  that  an  overreliance  on  rules  emerges  in  
situations  in  which  the  individual  with  AN  experiences  uncertainty  and/or  a  loss  of  
control.  According  to  this  model,  rule  following  may  be  initially  maintained  by  positive  
and  negative  reinforcement,  but  may  persist  in  the  presence  of  changing  contingencies  
(including  negative  consequences)  perhaps  because  of  rule-­‐‑based  insensitivity  and  a  
poverty  of  alternative  responses.  
The  neurocognitive  literature  provides  a  paradigm  (i.e.,  WCST)  to  test  RGB  in  
AN.  Findings  from  previous  studies  implementing  the  WCST  provide  evidence  of  rule-­‐‑
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based  insensitivity  and  impaired  flexibility  in  AN,  but  research  further  characterizing  
maladaptive  RGB  in  AN  is  needed.  Additionally,  the  study  of  rigidity  in  AN  has  largely  
been  circumscribed  to  the  starved  state  of  the  illness  with  the  few  studies  examining  
rigid  behaviors  post  recovery.  Exploring  maladaptive  RGB  among  individuals  weight-­‐‑
recovered  from  AN  will  therefore  add  to  this  important  literature  attempting  to  parse  
behavioral  patterns  unique  to  AN  versus  those  that  are  a  consequence  of  starvation.  
Furthermore,  identifying  situations  in  which  maladaptive  RGB  emerges  outside  of  the  
state  of  starvation  will  provide  important  information  on  factors  that  contribute  to  the  
development  and  maintenance  of  behavioral  rigidity.  It  is  not  known  if  maladaptive  
RGB  is  related  to  a  fear  of  uncertainty  with  effects  thus  potentiated  in  the  presence  of  
affect,  a  distressing  and  uncontrollable  state  for  individuals  with  AN  (Haynos  &  
Fruzzetti,  2011).  If  so,  this  would  provide  additional  support  for  the  model,  as  well  as  
advance  our  understanding  of  the  development  and  maintenance  of  rigid  behaviors  in  
AN  thus  providing  insight  into  the  needed  advancement  of  interventions.    
1.4.2 Study Aims and Hypotheses 
Following  above,  the  current  study  has  the  following  aims  and  hypotheses:  
Aim  1:  Determine  if  there  are  differences  between  individuals  weight-­‐‑recovered  
from  AN  (AN-­‐‑WR)  and  healthy  control  (CN)  individuals  in  their  intolerance  of  
uncertainty,  as  measured  by  the  Intolerance  of  Uncertainty  Scale  (IUS;  Buhr  &  Dugas,  
2002;  Freeston,  Rhéaume,  Letarte,  Dugas,  &  Ladouceur,  1994);  their  self-­‐‑reported  ability  
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to  regulate  emotion  as  evidenced  by  the  Difficulties  in  Emotion  Regulation  Scale  (DERS;  
Gratz  &  Roemer,  2004);  and  explore  if  these  variables  are  related  to  RGB  parameters  
(Acquisition,  Extinction,  and  Flexibility).  
Hypothesis:    The  AN-­‐‑WR  group  will  show  a  greater  intolerance  of  
uncertainty  and  greater  difficulties  with  emotion  regulation  than  the  CN  group  
(i.e.,  IUS:  AN-­‐‑WR  >  CN;  DERS:  AN-­‐‑WR  >  CN).  
Hypothesis:  Intolerance  of  uncertainty  and  difficulties  in  emotion  
regulation  will  be  associated  with  poorer  rule-­‐‑following  outcomes  exclusively  in  
the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  (i.e.,  IUS  and  DERS  will  negatively  correlate  with  WCST  
scores  measuring  Acquisition  and  Flexibility  and  positively  correlate  with  WCST  
scores  measuring  Extinction).  
  
Aim  2:  Compare  levels  of  uncertainty  reported  during  the  WCST  between  the  
AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN  groups  in  neutral  (Neutral)  and  anxious  (Stress)  states  and  explore  if  
these  variables  are  related  to  RGB  parameters  (i.e.,  Acquisition,  Extinction,  and  
Flexibility).  Uncertainty  during  the  WCST  will  be  measured  by  the  three  following  
questions:  On  average,  how  certain  did  you  feel  about  your  strategy  for  sorting  the  cards?  
(WCST  Certainty);  On  average,  how  certain  about  your  strategy  for  sorting  the  cards  did  you  
feel  after  you  were  told  you  were  “wrong”?  (WCST  Wrong);  What  was  the  greatest  level  of  
uncertainty  you  felt  during  the  task?  (WCST  Uncertainty).  
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Hypothesis:    The  AN-­‐‑WR  group  will  report  lower  levels  of  certainty  and  
higher  levels  of  uncertainty  than  the  CN  group  in  a  neutral  state  (i.e.,  WCST  
Certainty:  AN-­‐‑WR  <  CN;  WCST  Wrong:  AN-­‐‑WR  <  CN;  WCST  Uncertainty:  AN-­‐‑
WR  >  CN).  
Hypothesis:  The  AN-­‐‑WR  group  will  report  lower  levels  of  certainty  and  
higher  levels  of  uncertainty  than  the  CN  group  in  an  anxious  state  (i.e.,  WCST  
Certainty:  AN-­‐‑WR  <  CN;  WCST  Wrong:  AN-­‐‑WR  <  CN;  WCST  Uncertainty:  AN-­‐‑
WR  >  CN).  
Hypothesis:  Individuals  recovered  from  AN  in  an  anxious  state  will  
report  lower  levels  of  certainty  and  higher  levels  of  uncertainty  compared  to  
individuals  recovered  from  AN  in  a  neutral  state  (i.e.,  WCST  Certainty:  AN-­‐‑WR  
Neutral  <  AN-­‐‑WR  Stress;  WCST  Wrong:  AN-­‐‑WR  Neutral  <  AN-­‐‑WR  Stress;  
WCST  Uncertainty:  AN-­‐‑WR  Stress  >  AN-­‐‑WR  Neutral).  
Hypothesis:  There  will  be  no  differences  in  reported  uncertainty  levels  
between  health  control  individuals  in  a  neutral  state  compared  to  healthy  control  
individuals  in  an  anxious  state  (i.e.,  WCST  Certainty:  CN  Neutral  =  CN  Stress;  
WCST  Wrong:  CN  Neutral  =  AN-­‐‑WR  Stress;  WCST  Uncertainty:  CN  Neutral  =  
CN  Stress).  
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Hypothesis:  Lower  levels  of  perceived  certainty  and  greater  levels  of  
perceived  uncertainty  will  be  associated  with  maladaptive  RGB  exclusively  in  
the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  (i.e.,  WCST  Certainty  and  WCST  Wrong  will  positively  
correlate  with  WCST  scores  measuring  Acquisition  and  Flexibility  and  negatively  
correlate  with  WCST  scores  measuring  Extinction  whereas  WCST  Uncertainty  
will  negatively  correlate  with  WCST  scores  measuring  Acquisition  and  
Flexibility  and  positively  correlate  with  WCST  scores  measuring  Extinction).  
  
  Aim  3:  Compare  parameters  of  RGB  (i.e.,  Acquisition,  Extinction,  and  Flexibility)  
using  the  WCST  between  the  AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN  groups  in  neutral  and  anxious  states.  
Hypothesis:    The  AN-­‐‑WR  group  will  demonstrate  maladaptive  RGB  
relative  to  the  CN  group  in  a  neutral  state  as  defined  by  impaired  extinction  (i.e.,  
a  greater  number  of  Total  Perseverative  Errors  and  Number  of  Errors  in  the  2nd  
Category)  and  reduced  flexibility  (i.e.,  few  Categories  Completed  and  Total  
Correct),  but  will  demonstrate  faster  rates  of  acquisition  (i.e.,  a  lower  Rule  Rate  
and  fewer  Number  of  Trials  to  Complete  the  1st  Category).  
Hypothesis:  The  AN-­‐‑WR  group  will  demonstrate  maladaptive  RGB  
relative  to  the  CN  group  in  an  anxious  state,  as  defined  by  impaired  extinction  
(i.e.,  a  greater  number  of  Total  Perseverative  Errors  and  Number  of  Errors  in  the  
2nd  Category)  and  reduced  flexibility  (i.e.,  few  Categories  Completed  and  Total  
     31  
  
Correct),  but  will  demonstrate  faster  rates  of  acquisition  (i.e.,  a  lower  Rule  Rate  
and  fewer  Number  of  Trials  to  Complete  the  1st  Category).  
Hypothesis:    Individuals  recovered  from  AN  in  an  anxious  state  will  
demonstrate  maladaptive  RGB  relative  to  individuals  recovered  from  AN  in  a  
neutral  state  as  defined  by  impaired  extinction  (i.e.,  a  greater  number  of  Total  
Perseverative  Errors  and  Number  of  Errors  in  the  2nd  Category)  and  reduced  
flexibility  (i.e.,  few  Categories  Completed  and  Total  Correct),  but  will  
demonstrate  faster  rates  of  acquisition  (i.e.,  a  lower  Rule  Rate  and  fewer  Number  
of  Trials  to  Complete  the  1st  Category).  
Hypothesis:    There  will  be  no  differences  in  parameters  of  RGB  between  
healthy  control  individuals  in  a  neutral  state  compared  to  healthy  control  
individuals  in  an  anxious  state  as  defined  by  the  absence  of  any  significant  
differences  in  extinction  (i.e.,  number  of  Total  Perseverative  Errors  and  Number  
of  Errors  in  the  2nd  Category),  flexibility  (i.e.,  number  of  Categories  Completed  
and  Total  Correct),  or  acquisition  (i.e.,  Rule  Rate  and  Number  of  Trials  to  








The  sample  included  74  adults  (97.3%  female)  living  in  the  Southeastern  United  
States  who  agreed  to  participate  in  a  study  examining  the  way  individuals  with  eating  
disorders  process  information.  Participants  were  drawn  from  an  initial  sample  of  88  
individuals  who  expressed  interest  and  underwent  the  initial  diagnostic  phone  
interview,  75  of  whom  qualified  and  participated  in  the  current  study.  One  individual  
who  initially  qualified  for  participation  was  determined  to  be  ineligible  on  the  day  of  
study  due  to  low  weight  status.  Participants  were  classified  into  two  groups  based  on  a  
case-­‐‑control  design  as  follows:  weight-­‐‑restored  with  a  prior  diagnosis  of  AN  (AN:  n  =  
36),  and  no  history  of  AN  or  other  eating  disorder  (CN:  n  =38).      
2.1.1 AN Inclusion Criteria 
Participants  in  the  AN  group  had  to  have  a  previous  AN  diagnosis  in  accordance  
with  criteria  established  by  the  Diagnostic  and  Statistical  Manual  of  Mental  Disorders  V  
(DSM-­‐‑V;  American  Psychological  Association,  2010).  The  criteria  for  an  AN  diagnosis  
are  outlined  as  follows  (American  Psychological  Association,  2010,  p.  338):  
A.   Restriction   of   energy   intake   relative   to   requirements   leading   to   a  
significantly   low   body   weight   in   the   context   of   age,   sex,   developmental  
trajectory,   and  physical   health.   Significantly   low  weight   is   defined   as   a  weight  
that  is  less  than  minimally  normal,  or,  for  children  and  adolescents,  less  than  that  
minimally  expected.  
B.   Intense  fear  of  gaining  weight  or  becoming  fat,  or  persistent  behavior  
that  interferes  with  weight  gain,  even  though  at  a  significantly  low  weight.  
     33  
  
C.   Disturbance   in   the   way   in   which   one'ʹs   body   weight   or   shape   is  
experienced,   undue   influence   of   body   weight   or   shape   on   self-­‐‑evaluation,   or  
persistent  lack  of  recognition  of  the  seriousness  of  the  current  low  body  weight.  
  
In   addition   to   a   history   of   an  AN  diagnosis,   individuals   in   the  AN  group   also  
had  to  have  been  weight-­‐‑recovered  for  at  least  6  months.  Weight  recovery  was  defined  
as  having  a  body  mass   index   (BMI)  greater   than  or  equal   to  18.5  unless   the   individual  
indicated  that  a  healthy  weight  for  their  body  was  lower  than  the  18.5  cut-­‐‑off.  A  weight  
below  a  BMI  of  18.5  met  eligibility   for  weight  restoration   if   the   following  criteria  were  
met:  1)   the  participant  consistently  maintained   this  weight  without  attempts   to   restrict  
calories   or   engage   unhealthy   weight   loss   behaviors   (e.g.,   self-­‐‑induced   vomiting,  
excessive   exercise),   2)   the   participant   had   a   regular  menstrual   cycle,   3)   there  were   no  
other  signs  of  medical  compromise  at  this  weight.    
2.1.2 CN Inclusion Criteria 
Participants  in  the  CN  group  were  included  if  they  did  not  have  a  history  of  AN  
or  other  eating  disorder.  
2.1.3. Exclusion Criteria 
Study  exclusion  criteria  selected  to  control  for  the  influence  of  severe  
psychopathology.  Participants  were  excluded  from  study  participation  if  they  had  a  
lifetime  diagnosis  of  bipolar  disorder,  a  thought  disorder  such  as  schizophrenia,  a  
learning  disability,  or  were  currently  struggling  with  substance  abuse.  The  use  of  
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psychotropic  medication  was  permitted  in  both  the  AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN  groups  as  long  as  
the  participant  had  been  on  a  steady  dosage  for  at  least  two  months.  
2.2 Measures and Assessments 
The  self-­‐‑report  measures  (see  Table  2)  and  assessments  described  below  were  
selected  to  characterize  the  sample  on  current  eating  disorder  symptoms  and  attitudes,  
psychopathology,  intolerance  of  uncertainty,  emotion  regulation  ability,  and  
intelligence.  
2.2.1 Eating Disorder Examination—Questionnaire (EDE-Q) 
The  Eating  Disorder  Examination-­‐‑Questionnaire  (EDE-­‐‑Q;  Fairburn  &  Beglin,  
1994) is  a  41-­‐‑item  self-­‐‑report  version  of  the  Eating  Disorder  Examination  (EDE;  Fairburn,  
Wilson,  &  Schleimer,  1993).  Similar  to  the  EDE,  the  EDE-­‐‑Q  measures  eating  disorder  
psychopathology  and  yields  the  same  diagnostic  criteria  and  four  subscales  scores.  
Normative  data  collected  from  a  large  sample  of  young  adult  women  (n  =  5231)  between  
18  and  42  years  of  age  produced  the  following  subscale  means:    Restraint  (M  =  1.30,  SD  =  
1.40),  Eating  Concern  (M  =  0.76,  SD  =  1.06),  Weight  Concern  (M  =  1.79,  SD  =  1.51),  Shape  
Concern  (M  =  2.23,  SD  =  1.65)  (Mond,  Hay,  Rodgers,  &  Owen,  2006).  Additionally,  recent  
norms  collected  from  a  large  AN  sample  (n  =  382)  had  a  Global  Score  mean  of  4.17  (SD  =  
1.30)  and  a  general  population  (n  =  235)  Global  Score  mean  of  0.93  (SD  =  0.86)  (Aardoom,  
Dingemans,  Slof  Op'ʹt  Landt,  &  Van  Furth,  2012).  Good  convergence  between  the  EDE  
and  EDE-­‐‑Q  has  been  documented  among  community  and  clinical  samples,  though  
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inconsistencies  have  been  reported  (e.g.,  Fairburn  &  Beglin,  1994;  Mond,  Hay,  Rodgers,  
Owen,  &  Beumont,  2004).  The  internal  consistency  of  the  EDE-­‐‑Q  has  been  supported  in  
clinical  and  college  undergraduate  populations  (Peterson  et  al.,  2007)  and  acceptable  
concurrent  validity,  criterion  validity,  and  test-­‐‑retest  reliability  have  been  documented  
(Mond  et  al.,  2004).  
2.2.2 Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) 
The  Brief  Symptom  Inventory  (BSI;  Derogatis  &  Spencer,  1993)  is  a  shortened  
form  of  the  revised  version  of  the  Symptom  Checklist-­‐‑90  (Derogatis  &  Savitz,  1999),  a  
self-­‐‑report  measure  of  symptom  levels  reflecting  psychopathology.  The  BSI  consists  of  
49-­‐‑items  that  form  nine  symptom  dimensions  (Somatization,  Obsession-­‐‑Compulsion,  
Interpersonal  Sensitivity,  Depression,  Anxiety,  Hostility,  Phobic  Anxiety,  Paranoid  
ideation,  and  Psychoticism)  and  four  additional  clinically  relevant  items  that  do  not  
factor  into  any  of  the  dimensions.  Participants  are  asked  to  indicate  level  of  distress  
resulting  from  each  symptom  over  the  past  seven  days  using  a  Likert  scale  ranging  from  
“0  =  Not  at  all”  to  “4  =  Extremely.”  Sample  items  include  “Feeling  lonely,”  “Nausea  or  
upset  stomach,”  and  “Temper  outbursts  that  you  could  not  control.”  Scores  can  be  
converted  to  T-­‐‑scores  with  a  recommended  clinical  cut-­‐‑off  of  T  >  65  (Derogatis  &  
Spencer,  1993).  The  BSI  has  shown  good  internal  consistency  reliability  for  the  nine  
dimensions  with  alpha  coefficients  ranging  from  0.71  to  0.85,  and  test-­‐‑retest  reliability  
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coefficients  ranging  from  0.68  to  0.91  (Derogatis  &  Spencer,  1993).  Good  convergent,  
construct,  and  predictive  validity  have  been  reported  (Derogatis  &  Spencer,  1993).    
2.2.3 Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS) 
The  Intolerance  of  Uncertainty  Scale  (IUS;  Buhr  &  Dugas,  2002;  Freeston  et  al.,  
1994)  assesses  the  degree  to  which  uncertainty  is  experienced  as  unacceptable,  leads  to  
frustration  and  stress,  and  impairs  the  ability  to  take  action.  The  scale  consists  of  27-­‐‑
items  using  a  five-­‐‑point  Likert  scale  (“1  =  Not  at  all  characteristic  of  me”  to  “5  =  Entirely  
characteristic  of  me”).  Higher  scores  indicate  a  greater  intolerance  of  uncertainty.  
Sample  items  include  “Uncertainty  makes  me  uneasy,  anxious  or  stressed,”  
“Uncertainty  makes  life  intolerable”  and  “My  mind  can’t  be  relaxed  if  I  don’t  know  
what  will  happen  tomorrow.”  A  recent  study  administered  the  IUS  to  a  sample  of  
individuals  with  an  eating  disorder  and  healthy  controls  (Piech  et  al.,  2009).  Results  
indicated  a  mean  of  82.4  (SD  =  19.4)  among  30  individuals  with  AN  compared  to  a  mean  
of  48.3  (SD  =  11.3)  among  28  healthy  controls  (Frank  et  al.,  2012).  The  IUS  has  
demonstrated  good  psychometric  properties.  Excellent  internal  consistency  has  been  
shown  with  a  Cronbach’s  alpha  of  0.94  and  item-­‐‑total  correlations  ranging  from  0.36  to  
0.77  (Burh  &  Dugas,  2001).  Good  test-­‐‑retest  reliability  has  been  demonstrated  over  a  
five-­‐‑week  period  (r  =  0.74)  (Burh  &  Dugas,  2001).  Cronbach’s  alpha  for  the  current  study  
was  0.94.    
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2.2.4 Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS) 
The  Difficulties  in  Emotion  Regulation  Scale  (DERS;  Gratz  &  Roemer,  2004)  is  a  
self-­‐‑report  assessment  of  emotion  regulation  capacities  with  higher  scores  indicating  
greater  difficulties  in  emotion  regulation.  The  scale  consists  of  36  statements  related  to  
emotion  regulation  capacities  and  asks  the  individual  to  indicate  how  often  each  of  the  
statements  apply  using  a  five-­‐‑point  Likert  scale  ranging  from    “1  =  Almost  Never  (0-­‐‑
10%)”  to  “5  =  Almost  Always  (91-­‐‑100%)”.    Sample  items  include  “I  know  exactly  how  I  
am  feeling,”  “When  I’m  upset,  I  have  difficulty  getting  work  done,”  and  “When  I’m  
upset,  I  feel  guilty  for  feeling  that  way.”  Norms  derived  from  a  sample  of  female  college  
aged  students  indicates  a  DERS  overall  mean  of  77.99  (SD  =  20.27).  Good  psychometric  
properties  have  been  demonstrated,  including  high  internal  consistency  (subscale  
Cronbach’s  alpha  ranged  between  0.80-­‐‑0.89)  and  adequate  construct  and  predictive  
validity  (Gratz  &  Roemer,  2004).  Cronbach’s  alpha  for  the  current  study  was  0.82.    
2.2.5 State-Trait Anxiety Inventory—Form Y (STAI) 
The  state  scale  of  the  State-­‐‑Trait  Anxiety  Inventory  (STAI;  Spielberger,1983)  was  
selected  to  assess  the  effect  of  the  mood  manipulation.  The  STAI  state  scale  is  a  brief  
questionnaire  intended  to  capture  fluctuations  in  anxiety  in  response  to  stressors  with  
higher  scores  indicating  greater  state  levels  of  anxiety.  The  STAI  state  scale  consists  of  20  
statements  reflecting  acute  anxiety  (e.g.,  “I  am  tense”;  “I  feel  nervous”)  and  asks  people  
to  indicate  how  they  feel  “right  now,  that  is,  at  this  moment”  using  a  4-­‐‑point  intensity  
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scale  (“0  =  not  at  all”  to  “4  =  very  much  so”).  Norms  derived  from  a  sample  of  645  female  
college-­‐‑aged  students  indicates  a  mean  STAI  state  scale  score  of  39.36  when  tested  in  a  
nonstressful  situation  and  60.51  when  tested  in  a  stressful  situation  (Spielberger,  1983).  
Good  psychometric  properties  have  been  demonstrated,  including  high  internal  
consistency  (median  Cronbach’s  alpha  of  0.93)  and  low  stability  coefficients  ranging  
from  0.16  to  0.62  (Spielberger,  1983);  low  stability  coefficients  are  expected  and  reflect  
variability  in  anxiety  in  response  to  situational  factors.  The  STAI  state  scale  has  
demonstrated  higher  reliability  coefficients  when  given  under  conditions  of  
psychological  stress  (e.g.,  alpha  reliability  coefficient  of  0.94  when  administered  
immediately  following  a  distressing  film;  Spielberger,  1983).  Additionally,  adequate  
psychometric  properties  have  been  established  among  both  clinical  and  healthy  
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Table  2:  Self-­‐‑Report  Measures  
         Measure Description Scales/Subscales #Questions & Expected 



































Overall IUS Score 27 items/~5 minutes 
Difficulties in Emotion 











assessing state anxiety 
STAI State Score 20 items/~5 minutes 
 
2.2.6 Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) 
The  Wechsler  Abbreviated  Scale  of  Intelligence  (WASI;  Wechsler,  1999)  is  a  
shortened  version  of  the  Wechsler  Adult  Intelligence  Scale—Third  Edition  (Wechsler,  
1997).  Full  Scale  IQ  can  be  estimated  from  the  four  WASI  subtests:  vocabulary,  
similarities,  matrix  reasoning,  and  block  design.  The  WASI  has  demonstrated  good  
convergent  validity  with  the  WAIS-­‐‑III  and  high  levels  of  internal  consistency  for  the  Full  
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Scale  IQ  estimate  (Wechsler,  1999).  Raw  scores  can  be  converted  to  standard  scores  with  
a  mean  of  100  and  a  standard  deviation  of  15.  
2.2.7 RGB 
The  Wisconsin  Card  Sorting  Task  (WCST;  Berg,  1948)  was  selected  to  assess  RGB.  
A  computerized  version  of  the  WCST  was  implemented  in  the  current  study  (Heaton,  
2003).  The  computerized  settings  were  as  follows:  Visual  Feedback  Duration  1.0  seconds;  
Audio  Feedback  Male  Voice;  Card  Animation  Move  time  1.5  seconds,  and  Card  
Animation  Frame  Time  10  milliseconds.  During  the  task,  participants  are  asked  to  match  
a  stimulus  card  (e.g.,  two  blue  triangles)  to  one  of  four  target  cards:  single  red  triangle,  
two  green  stars,  three  yellow  crosses,  and  four  blue  circles  but  are  not  given  instructions  
on  how  to  match  the  cards.  Computerized  feedback  indicates  whether  or  not  the  
response  was  “right”  or  “wrong.”  Following  feedback,  participants  are  given  a  new  card  
to  match  until  a  total  of  128  cards  have  been  sorted.  Unbeknownst  to  the  participant,  the  
correct  sorting  rule  changes  automatically  after  10  consecutive  correct  responses.  In  
addition  to  standard  WCST  scores,  the  current  study  has  developed  novel  scores  to  
further  aid  in  the  characterization  of  RGB  (i.e.,  acquisition,  extinction,  and  flexibility  of  
verbal  rules).  Outcome  scores  for  the  current  study  are  described  in  Table  1.    
After  completion  of  the  WCST,  participants  were  asked  three  questions  to  assess  
their  level  of  uncertainty  during  the  task.  The  first  two  questions  utilized  a  continuous  
sliding  scale  ranging  from  “Not  at  All”  to  “Extremely”  and  read  as  follows:    On  average,  
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how  certain  did  you  feel  about  your  strategy  for  sorting  the  cards?  (WCST  Certainty  –  higher  
scores  reflect  greater  levels  of  certainty).  On  average,  how  certain  about  your  strategy  for  
sorting  the  cards  did  you  feel  after  you  were  told  you  were  “wrong”?  (WCST  Wrong  –  higher  
scores  reflect  greater  levels  of  certainty  after  being  told  you  were  “wrong”).  The  last  
question  utilized  a  continuous  sliding  scale  ranging  from  “None”  to  “Extreme”  and  read  
as  follows:  What  was  the  greatest  level  of  uncertainty  you  felt  during  the  task?  (WCST  
Uncertainty  -­‐‑  higher  scores  reflect  a  greater  degree  of  uncertainty  experienced  during  
the  task).    
2.3 Procedure 
All  procedures  were  approved  by  the  Duke  University  Medical  Center  
Institutional  Review  Board.    
2.3.1 Recruitment 
Participants  were  recruited  from  Duke  University,  Duke  University  Medical  
Center,  and  the  general  community  via  poster  and  online  advertisement.  Individuals  
interested  in  study  participation  underwent  an  initial  telephone  interview  conducted  by  
a  Ph.D.  level  graduate  student.  This  interview  assessed  study  eligibility  and  included  a  
semi-­‐‑structured  interview  assessing  lifetime  history  of  an  AN  diagnosis  and  weight  
recovery  status.  Individuals  who  met  initial  screening  criteria  were  given  an  option  to  
complete  a  full  eating  disorder  history  assessment  either  by  telephone  or  
Qualtrics.com®,  a  secure  online  survey  platform.  This  two-­‐‑step  screening  process  
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reduced  participant  and  research  burden  by  facilitating  the  identification  of  ineligible  
individuals  and  allows  for  individuals  to  choose  how  they  prefer  to  discuss  their  eating  
disorder  history.  All  participants  were  offered  a  clinical  referral  resource  list.  
2.3.2 Laboratory Paradigm 
Informed  consent  was  obtained  upon  arrival  to  the  study.  Participants  were  then  
administered  the  WASI  and  completed  self-­‐‑report  questionnaires  including  and  ending  
with  the  STAI  to  provide  a  baseline  assessment  of  stress  and  anxiety.  Participants  then  
underwent  a  stress  or  neutral  mood  manipulation  (described  below)  based  on  random  
assignment.  Immediately  following  the  mood  manipulation,  all  participants  again  
completed  the  STAI  to  assess  current  level  of  stress  and  anxiety.  Following  this,  all  
participants  completed  the  WCST.  Weight  and  height  measurements  were  then  taken  
(all  participants  were  blind  to  their  weight).  Participants  were  asked  questions  about  
their  level  of  uncertainty  during  the  task  (see  description  of  WCST  above),  were  
interviewed  about  time  since  eating  disorder  symptoms  (i.e.,  binge  eating,  self-­‐‑induced  
vomiting,  excessive  exercise,  laxative  abuse,  diuretic  abuse,  and  diet  pill  abuse),  and  
completed  the  EDE-­‐‑Q.  Participants  were  then  debriefed  and  offered  clinical  resources.  
2.3.3 Mood Manipulation 
Participants  were  randomly  assigned  to  either  a  Stress  or  Neutral  condition  via  a  
random  number  generator.  If  randomly  assigned  to  the  neutral  condition,  participants  
were  told  that  they  were  going  to  be  given  some  time  to  take  a  break  and  were  provided  
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with  a  neutral  magazine  (i.e.,  a  travel  magazine  that  had  scenic  pictures  and  did  not  
have  images  of  people)  to  view.  Participants  were  left  alone  in  the  study  room  for  a  10-­‐‑
minute  period  and  upon  return  were  asked  to  complete  another  brief  questionnaire  
(STAI)  before  moving  on  to  a  computer  task.  Participants  randomly  assigned  to  the  
Stress  condition  underwent  a  stress  induction  modeled  after  the  well-­‐‑validated  Trier  
Social  Stress  Test  (Kirschbaum,  Pirke,  &  Hellhammer,  1993).  Participants  were  taken  to  a  
room  with  a  microphone  and  one-­‐‑way  mirror  and  told  the  following:    
“We’re  going  to  have  you  take  the  role  of  a  job  applicant  for  your  dream  
job  who  has  been  invited  in  for  an  interview  with  the  company’s  staff  
managers—three  other  individuals,  who  you’ll  meet  a  little  later.  
  
In  a  little  bit,  we’re  going  to  ask  you  to  give  a  speech  lasting  5  minutes  
that  convinces  them  you’re  the  perfect  applicant  for  this  position.  You’ll  have  
some  time  to  prepare  for  your  speech.”  
  
Participants  were  then  taken  to  a  small  room  located  on  the  other  side  of  the  one-­‐‑
way  mirror  that  contained  audio  and  video  recording  equipment  (which  was  set  up  for  
actual  recording)  along  with  chairs  for  the  “staff  managers.”  Participants  were  told  the  
following:  
“Three  individuals  will  watch  and  listen  to  your  speech  in  this  room.  
They  have  been  trained  to  monitor  nonverbal  behavior  and  will  be  judging  and  
evaluating  your  speech  and  your  performance.”  
  
Participants  were  then  taken  back  to  the  previous  study  room.  They  were  
provided  with  a  pen  and  some  paper  and  were  told  they  would  have  some  time  to  
prepare  for  their  speech.  They  were  then  left  alone  in  the  room  for  a  period  of  10-­‐‑
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minutes.  After  10  minutes,  the  researcher  returned  to  the  room  and  told  the  participant  
that  it  looked  like  they  had  enough  time  to  complete  a  computer  task  before  beginning  
the  speech  task.  They  were  then  asked  to  complete  another  brief  questionnaire  (STAI)  
before  moving  on  to  the  computer  task  (WCST).  Immediately  following  completion  of  
the  WCST,  participants  were  told  that  they  were  not  actually  going  to  give  a  speech.  
They  were  also  asked  the  following:  Did  you  think  you  were  going  to  have  to  give  the  
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3. Data Analytic Strategy 
3.1 Normality 
Distributions  of  all  outcome  measures  were  examined  for  univariate  and  
multivariate  normality  via  visual  examination  and  measures  of  skewness  and  kurtosis.  
Transformations  were  conducted  in  the  event  of  non-­‐‑normality  and  parametric  tests  
were  planned  if  adequate  normality  could  not  be  established.    
3.2 Sample Demographics 
Demographic  variables,  including  current  age,  completed  years  of  education,  IQ  
and  BMI,  were  compared  across  each  of  the  four  cells  (AN-­‐‑WR  Stress,  AN-­‐‑WR  Neutral,  
CN  Stress,  CN  Neutral).  Two-­‐‑way  between  subjects  analysis  of  variance  (ANOVAs)  
were  used  to  determine  the  effectiveness  of  random  assignment  on  these  variables.  
3.3 Sample Characterization 
One-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑subjects  ANOVAs  were  conducted  to  examine  group  
differences  (AN-­‐‑WR  vs.  CN)  on  eating  disorder  symptoms  (as  assessed  by  the  EDE-­‐‑Q)  
and  secondary  psychopathology  (i.e.,  Dimensional  BSI  T-­‐‑scores).  One-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑
subjects  ANOVAs  were  conducted  to  ensure  that  there  were  not  any  differences  
between  the  two  AN  and  CN  conditions  (AN-­‐‑WR  Stress  vs.  AN-­‐‑WR  Neutral;  CN  Stress  
vs.  CN  Neutral)  across  the  following  relevant  clinical  outcomes:  eating  disorder  
symptoms  (as  assessed  by  the  EDE-­‐‑Q),  number  of  years  since  unhealthy  low  weight,  and  
secondary  psychopathology  (i.e.,  anxiety  and  depression  as  assessed  by  the  BSI  T-­‐‑
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scores).  Pearson  chi-­‐‑square  tests  were  conducted  to  examine  whether  there  were  any  
relationships  between  the  two  AN  conditions  (AN-­‐‑WR  Stress  vs.  AN-­‐‑WR  Neutral)  and  
the  lifetime  presence  of  eating  disorder  symptoms  (i.e.,  binge  eating,  self-­‐‑induced  
vomiting,  excessive  exercise,  diuretic  abuse,  laxative  abuse,  and  diet  pill  abuse).    
3.4 Manipulation Check 
A  repeated  measures  ANOVA  with  two  between  subject  factors  (Group  and  
Condition)  and  one  within  subject  factor  (Time)  was  used  to  assess  the  success  of  the  
mood  manipulation.  Success  of  the  mood  manipulation  was  defined  as  significant  
increases  between  the  STAI  score  at  time  one  and  time  two  exclusively  among  those  in  
the  Stress  Condition  (i.e.,  a  Condition  by  Time  interaction).      
3.5 RGB and Difficulties with Uncertainty and Emotion 
Regulation 
3.5.1 Group Differences 
One-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑subjects  ANOVAs  were  conducted  to  assess  hypothesized  
differences  between  the  AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN  groups  on  intolerance  of  uncertainty  (as  
assessed  by  the  IUS)  and  difficulties  with  emotion  regulation  (as  assessed  by  the  DERS).  
3.5.2 Associations Between RGB and Difficulties with Uncertainty and 
Emotion Regulation 
Bivariate  correlation  analyses  stratified  by  group  (AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN)  were  used  to  
assess  associations  between  RGB  outcomes  (WCST  scores  indexing  acquisition,  
extinction,  and  flexibility)  and  intolerance  of  uncertainty  (as  assessed  by  the  IUS)  and  
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emotion  regulation  capacity  (DERS  overall  score)  along  with  anxiety  and  depression  (as  
assessed  by  the  BSI).    
3.6 RGB and WCST Uncertainty 
3.6.1 Group Differences 
Two-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑subjects  ANOVAs  were  used  to  analyze  differences  on  the  
three  uncertainty  ratings  related  to  WCST  performance.  The  independent  variables  
consisted  of  two  levels  of  Group  (AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN)  and  two  levels  of  Condition  (Stress  
and  Neutral)  with  the  following  dependent  variables:  On  average,  how  certain  did  you  feel  
about  your  strategy  for  sorting  the  cards?  (WCST  Certainty);  On  average,  how  certain  about  
your  strategy  for  sorting  the  cards  did  you  feel  after  you  were  told  you  were  “wrong”?  (WCST  
Wrong);  What  was  the  greatest  level  of  uncertainty  you  felt  during  the  task?  (WCST  
Uncertainty).    
3.6.2 Associations Between RGB and WCST Uncertainty 
Bivariate  correlation  analyses  stratified  by  group  (AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN)  were  used  to  
test  the  associations  between  the  uncertainty  ratings  related  to  WCST  performance  
(WCST  Certainty,  WCST  Wrong,  WCST  Uncertainty)  and  RGB  outcomes  (WCST  scores  
indexing  acquisition,  extinction,  and  flexibility).  
3.7 RGB and the Presence of Affective Arousal 
Three  between-­‐‑subjects  multivariate  analysis  of  variance  controlling  for  IQ  
(MANCOVAs)  were  initially  planned  to  examine  differences  in  acquisition,  extinction,  
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and  flexibility  as  measured  by  WCST  outcomes  (see  Table  1).  Tests  controlling  for  IQ  
were  selected  given  the  potential  impact  of  IQ  on  WCST  scores.  All  MANCOVA’s  were  
to  assess  the  main  effects  and  interaction  of  independent  variables  (Group  and  
Condition)  and  the  following  relevant  WCST  outcomes:  acquisition  (Rule  Rate  and  
Number  of  Cards  to  Complete  First  Category),  extinction  (Total  Perseverative  Errrors  
and  Perseverative  Errors  During  First  Category  Change),  and  flexibility  (Total  Correct  
and  Number  of  Categories  Completed).  ANCOVAs  were  selected  as  an  alternative  
analysis  strategy  when  the  statistical  assumptions  required  for  the  MANCOVA  were  
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4. Results 
4.1 Sample Demographics 
See  Table  3  for  demographic  information  of  the  74  individuals  who  participated  
in  the  current  study.  Most  of  the  sample  was  female  (97.30%)  and  the  majority  was  
Caucasian  (67.60%).  Participants’  ages  ranged  from  18  to  36  with  a  mean  of  22.76  years  
(SD  =  3.95).  The  IQ  of  the  sample  was  in  the  superior  range  of  functioning  with  a  mean  
of  120.27  (SD  =  10.10).  The  mean  BMI  (M  =  22.13,  SD  =  3.03)  was  in  the  normal  range.  
Completed  years  of  education  ranged  from  12  to  22  with  a  mean  of  15.24  (SD  =  2.25).  
Two-­‐‑way  between  subjects  ANOVAS  indicated  that  there  were  no  significant  differences  
between  Group,  Condition,  or  the  interaction  of  the  two  on  age,  IQ,  or  BMI.  However,  
there  was  a  significant  main  effect  of  Condition  such  that  participants  in  the  Stress  
condition  (M  =  15.86,  SD  =  2.46)  had  significantly  more  years  of  education  than  those  in  
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Table  3:  Sample  Demographics  
 
  
 AN-WR  CN  Total 
 (n = 36)  (n = 38)  (n = 74) 
      
Variable: Mean (SD)      
Age  22.53 (3.81)  22.97 (4.13)  22.76 (3.95) 
IQ  121.97 (9.69)  118.66 (10.33)  120.27 (10.10) 
Years of Education 15.14 (2.27)  15.26 (2.24)  15.20 (2.24) 
Body Mass Index 21.55 (2.58)  22.68 (3.35)  22.13 (3.03) 
      
Sex/Ethnicity: # (%)      
Female 35 (97.2%)  37 (97.4%)  72 (97.30%) 
Male 1 (2.80%)  1 (2.60%)  2 (2.70%) 
White/Caucasian 28 (77.80%)  22 (57.90%)  50 (67.60%) 
Black/African American 2 (5.60%)  7 (18.40%)  9 (12.20%) 
Asian 5 (13.90%)  6 (15.80%)  11 (14.90%) 
Hispanic/Latino 0 (0.00%)  2 (5.30%)  2 (2.70%) 
Mixed Race 1 (2.80%)  1 (2.60%)  2 (2.70%) 
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4.2 Sample Characterization 
4.2.1 Eating Disorder Pathology 
One-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑subjects  ANOVAs  compared  the  mean  EDE-­‐‑Q  subscale  scores  
(EDE-­‐‑Q  Restraint;  EDE-­‐‑Q  Eating  Concerns;  EDE-­‐‑Q  Shape  Concerns;  EDE-­‐‑Q  Weight  
Concerns;  EDE-­‐‑Q  Global  Score)  between  the  AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN  groups  (see  Table  4).  Due  
to  the  presence  of  non-­‐‑normality,  ANOVAs  were  conducted  on  logarithmic  transformed  
EDE-­‐‑Q  variables.  The  AN-­‐‑WR  group  means  were  significantly  higher  than  the  CN  
group  means  across  all  EDE-­‐‑Q  subscale  scores  indicating  that  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  
reported  higher  levels  of  eating  disorder  pathology.  
4.2.2 Psychopathology 
One-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑subjects  ANOVAs  compared  the  mean  BSI  Dimensional  T-­‐‑
Scores  between  the  AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN  groups  (see  Table  4).  The  AN-­‐‑WR  group  means  
were  significantly  higher  than  the  CN  group  means  across  all  BSI  dimensions  indicating  
that  AN-­‐‑WR  group  reported  higher  levels  of  psychopathology.  Importantly,  while  the  
AN-­‐‑WR  group  means  were  significantly  higher  than  the  CN  group  means,  all  of  the  AN-­‐‑
WR  means  were  well  below  the  recommended  clinical  cut-­‐‑off  of  T  >  65  (Derogatis,  1983).  
This  indicates  that  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  means  did  not  reach  clinical  threshold.    
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.           
1 Analysis of variance was conducted to test group differences.   
 2 Data were analyzed after logarithmic transformation. 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
 AN-WR CN  Cohen’s d 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD)  Effect 
 (n = 36) (n = 38) F(1,73)1 Size 
EDE-Q Restraint2 2.18 (0.98) 1.45 (0.50) 18.41*** 0.94 
EDE-Q Eating Concern2 1.73 (0.69) 1.12 (0.18) 32.82*** 1.21 
EDE-Q Shape Concern2 3.18 (1.31) 1.92 (0.99) 23.99*** 1.09 
EDE-Q Weight Concern2 2.77 (1.18) 1.70 (0.93) 23.35*** 1.01 
EDE-Q Global Score2 2.47 (0.90) 1.55 (0.57) 30.47*** 1.22 
     
BSI Somatization 50.81 (8.71) 44.58 (6.40) 12.37*** 0.82 
BSI Obsessive Compulsive 58.06 (9.94) 52.61 (9.67) 5.72* 0.56 
BSI Interpersonal 
Sensitivity 
57.69 (11.07) 52.76 (9.29) 4.32* 0.48 
BSI Depression 56.28 (10.37) 50.61 (8.15) 6.89* 0.61 
BSI Anxiety 52.58 (10.64) 46.84 (8.38) 6.69* 0.60 
BSI Hostility 53.83 (7.35) 47.61 (8.70) 11.00*** 0.77 
BSI Phobic Anxiety 53.42 (8.51) 47.68 (5.18) 12.39*** 0.81 
BSI Paranoid Ideation 53.50 (9.99) 49.26 (8.07) 4.05* 0.47 
BSI Psychoticism 58.97 (10.08) 53.32 (8.79) 6.65* 0.60 
BSI Global Severity 56.72 (9.20) 48.92 (8.21) 14.85*** 0.89 
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4.3 AN-WR Sample Characterization 
4.3.1 Eating Disorder Pathology 
One-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑subjects  ANOVAs  compared  the  mean  EDE-­‐‑Q  subscale  scores  
(EDE-­‐‑Q  Restraint;  EDE-­‐‑Q  Eating  Concerns;  EDE-­‐‑Q  Shape  Concerns;  EDE-­‐‑Q  Weight  
Concerns;  EDE-­‐‑Q  Global  Score)  between  the  AN-­‐‑WR  Stress  and  AN-­‐‑WR  Neutral  
conditions  (see  Table  5).  There  were  no  significant  differences  between  the  AN-­‐‑WR  
Stress  and  AN-­‐‑WR  Neutral  conditions  on  any  EDE-­‐‑Q  outcome  indicating  that  the  two  
AN-­‐‑WR  conditions  did  not  differ  on  eating  disorder  pathology.  There  also  were  not  any  
significant  differences  between  the  CN  Stress  and  CN  Neutral  conditions  on  eating  
disorder  pathology.    
4.3.2 Anxiety and Depression 
One-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑subjects  ANOVAs  compared  the  mean  BSI  Anxiety  and  
Depression  T-­‐‑Scores  between  the  AN-­‐‑WR  Stress  and  AN-­‐‑WR  Neutral  conditions  (see  
Table  5).  There  were  no  significant  differences  between  the  AN-­‐‑WR  Stress  and  AN-­‐‑WR  
Neutral  conditions  indicating  that  the  two  AN-­‐‑WR  conditions  did  not  differ  on  anxiety  
or  depression.  There  also  were  not  any  significant  differences  between  the  CN  Stress  and  
CN  Neutral  conditions  on  anxiety  or  depression.  
4.3.3 Number of Years Since Unhealthy Low Weight 
The  number  of  years  since  unhealthy  low  weight  across  the  AN-­‐‑WR  sample  
ranged  from  0.75  to  12  years  with  a  mean  of  4.29  (SD  =  3.13).  A  one-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑
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subjects  ANOVA  compared  the  mean  number  of  years  since  low  weight  between  the  
AN-­‐‑WR  Stress  and  AN-­‐‑WR  Neutral  conditions  (see  Table  5).  There  were  no  significant  
differences  between  the  AN-­‐‑WR  Stress  (M  =  21.77,  SD  =  3.17)  and  AN-­‐‑WR  Neutral  (M  =  
4.69,  SD  =  3.55)  conditions  indicating  that  the  two  AN-­‐‑WR  conditions  did  not  differ  on  
the  number  of  years  since  unhealthy  low  weight.  
4.3.4 Eating Disorder Behavioral Symptoms 
The  percentage  of  lifetime  presence  of  the  following  symptoms  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  
sample  are  presented  in  Table  5.  Pearson  chi-­‐‑square  tests  revealed  that  there  was  not  a  
significant  relationship  between  Condition  and  the  lifetime  presence  of  any  eating  
disorder  symptom.  Additionally,  over  the  past  year,  2  individuals  (5.60%)  had  engaged  
in  binge  eating,  1  individual  (2.8%)  had  engaged  in  self-­‐‑induced  vomiting,  and  10  
individuals  (16.70%)  had  engaged  in  excessive  exercise  for  at  least  two  times  during  a  
one-­‐‑week  period.  No  individuals  had  engaged  in  diuretic  abuse,  laxative  abuse,  or  diet  
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Table  5:  AN-­‐‑WR  Sample  Characterization  
 
        1Analysis of variance was conducted to test group differences.   
     2 Pearson chi-square test of independence was performed to examine whether there was a relationship      
       between Condition and the lifetime presence of the eating disorder symptom 







 (n = 19) (n = 17) (n = 36) 
Variable: Mean (SD)    
Body Mass Index1 21.36 (1.98) 21.77 (3.17) 21.55 (2.58) 
# Years Since Unhealthy Low Weight1 4.69 (3.55) 3.87 (2.65) 4.29 (3.13) 
    
EDE-Q Restraint1 2.20 (0.97) 2.16 (1.02) 2.18 (0.98) 
EDE-Q Eating Concern1 1.78 (0.52) 1.68 (0.85) 1.73 (0.69) 
EDE-Q Shape Concern1 3.32 (1.32) 3.04 (1.31) 3.18 (1.31) 
EDE-Q Weight Concern1 2.85 (0.94) 2.68 (1.43) 2.77 (1.18) 
EDE-Q Global Score1 2.54 (0.78) 2.39 (1.04) 2.47 (0.99) 
    
BSI Anxiety1 53.32 (10.35) 51.76 (11.22) 52.58 (10.64) 
BSI Depression1 54.58 (10.10) 58.18 (10.66) 56.28 (10.37) 
    
Variable: # (%)    
Lifetime Binge Eating2 7 (36.80%) 4 (23.50%) 11 (30.60%) 
Lifetime Self-Induced Vomiting2 7 (36.80%) 6 (35.30%) 13 (36.10%) 
Lifetime Excessive Exercise2 13 (68.4%) 14 (82.40%) 27 (75.00%) 
Lifetime Diuretic Abuse2 3 (15.8%) 1 (5.9%) 4 (11.10%) 
Lifetime Laxative Abuse2 6 (31.6%) 3 (17.6%) 9 (25.00%) 
Lifetime Diet Pill Abuse2 3 (15.8%) 1 (5.90%) 4 (11.10%) 
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4.4 Manipulation Check 
Participants  in  the  Stress  condition  were  asked  to  respond  with  “yes,”  “no,”  or  
“maybe”  to  the  following  question:  “Did  you  think  you  were  going  to  have  to  give  a  
speech?”  Most  participants  were  convinced  they  were  going  to  have  to  give  a  speech  
with  32  (89%)  responding  with  “yes”,  4  (11.1%)  responding  with  “maybe”,  and  0  (0%)  
responding  with  “no.”  A  repeated  measures  ANOVA  with  two  between  subject  factors,  
Group  (AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN)  and  Condition  (Stress  and  Neutral),  and  one  within  subject  
level  Time  (STAI  Time  1  and  STAI  Time  2)  was  used  to  assess  the  success  of  the  stress  
induction  (see  Table  6  for  Means  (SD)).  There  was  a  main  effect  of  Time,  F(1,68)  =  10.38,  
p  <  .01,  indicating  that  STAI  scores  significantly  increased  from  Time  1  to  Time  2.  
However,  this  was  qualified  by  a  significant  Time  X  Condition  interaction,  F(1,68)  =  
25.35,  p  <  .001,  indicating  that,  as  expected,  scores  only  significantly  increased  in  the  
Stress  condition,  but  did  not  significantly  change  in  the  Neutral  Condition  (see  Figure  4).  
There  was  not  a  significant  Time  X  Group  (F(1,68)  =  .05,  p  =  .82)  or  Time  X  Condition  X  
Group  (F(1,68)  =  .07,  p  =  .80)  interaction  indicating  that  the  effect  of  the  stress  induction  
did  not  depend  on  group  status.    
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Table  6:  STAI  Scores  at  Time  1  and  2  
   *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
  
  





           STAI 
Time 1 
Mean (SD) 
          STAI 
Time 2 
Mean (SD) 
Cohen’s d Effect 
Size 
 
   AN-WR Neutral (n = 19) 33.11 (9.80) 32.11 (9.75) 0.10 
AN-WR Stress (n = 17) 35.00 (12.18) 41.18 (11.99) -0.51* 
    
CN Neutral (n = 18) 28.11 (6.98) 26.39 (6.07) 0.26 
CN Stress (n = 18) 27.61 (7.41) 33.83 (9.68) -0.72** 
    
AN-WR Group (n = 36) 34.00 (10.87) 36.39 (11.65) -0.21 
CN Group (n = 36) 27.86 (7.10) 30.11 (8.82) -0.28 
 
 
   
Neutral Condition (n = 37) 30.58 (8.80) 29.32 (8.56) 0.15 
Stress Condition (n = 35) 31.20 (10.55) 37.40 (11.33) -0.57*** 
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4.5 RGB and Difficulties with Uncertainty and Emotion 
Regulation 
4.5.1 Group Differences  
A  one-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑subjects  ANOVA  compared  the  mean  IUS  score  between  the  
AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN  groups  (see  Table  7).  Due  to  the  presence  of  non-­‐‑normality,  the  
ANOVAs  were  conducted  on  IUS  after  logarithmic  transformation.  As  hypothesized,  the  
AN-­‐‑WR  IUS  group  mean  (M  =  66.89,  SD  =  18.61)  was  significantly  higher  than  the  CN  
group  mean  (M  =  49.74,  SD  =  14.18),  F(1,73)  =  23.00,  p  <  .001,  partial  η2  =  .24,  indicating  
that  individuals  with  AN  reported  a  greater  intolerance  of  uncertainty.  
A  one-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑subjects  ANOVA  compared  the  mean  DERS  Overall  score  
between  the  AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN  groups  (see  Table  7).  Due  to  the  presence  of  non-­‐‑
normality,  the  ANOVA  was  conducted  on  DERS  Overall  score  after  logarithmic  
transformation.  As  hypothesized,  the  AN-­‐‑WR  DERS  Overall  group  mean  (M  =  79.75,  SD  
=  19.53)  was  significantly  higher  than  the  CN  group  mean  (M  =  64.47,  SD  =  14.06),  F(1,73)  
=  14.06,  p  <  .001,  partial  η2  =  .16,  indicating  that  individuals  with  AN  reported  great  
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1Analysis of variance was conducted to test group differences. 
 2 Data were analyzed after logarithmic transformation.  
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
  
4.5.2 Associations Between RGB and Difficulties with Uncertainty and 
Emotion Regulation 
Bivariate  correlation  analyses  stratified  by  group  (AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN)  were  
conducted  to  test  the  associations  between  RGB  outcomes  (6  WCST  scores)  and  
intolerance  of  uncertainty  (as  assessed  by  the  IUS),  and  emotion  regulation  capacity  (as  
assessed  by  the  DERS  overall  score),  along  with  anxiety  and  depression  (as  assessed  by  
the  BSI).  Analyses  were  run  on  logarithmic  transformed  variables  when  raw  scores  were  
not  normally  distributed  and  with  outliers  excluded.  The  WCST  Categories  Completed  
score  was  not  included  in  this  analysis  due  to  insufficient  variability.  There  were  not  any  
significant  associations  between  RGB  and  the  outcomes  of  interest  in  the  CN  Group.  
Similarly  there  were  not  any  significant  associations  between  RGB  and  the  outcomes  of  
 Raw Scores   
 AN-WR  CN  Cohen’s d 
 Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  Effect 
 (n = 36)  (n = 38) F(1,73)1 Size 
      Intolerance of 
Uncertainty2 
66.89 (18.63)  49.74 (14.18) 23.00*** 1.04 
      
DERS Overall2 79.75 (19.53)  64.47 (14.45) 14.06*** 0.89 
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interest  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  Group  with  the  exception  of  the  IUS.  More  specifically,  a  greater  
intolerance  of  uncertainty  was  associated  with  more  Total  Perseverative  Errors  on  the  
WCST  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group,  r  =  .36,  n  =  35,  p  <  .05.    
4.6 RGB and WCST Uncertainty 
4.6.1 Group Differences  
Two-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑subjects  ANOVAs  were  selected  to  analyze  group  differences  
on  the  three  certainty  ratings  about  WCST  performance  (see  Table  8  for  means  (SD)).  
There  were  no  significant  effects  of  Group,  F(1,69)  =  2.11,  p  =  .15,  partial  η2  =  .03,  
Condition,  F(1,69)  =  1.23,  p  =  .27,  partial  η2  =  .02,  or  interaction  of  the  two,  F(1,69)  =  .71,  p  
=  .40,  partial  η2  =  .01,  for  WCST  Certainty.  This  indicates  that  there  were  not  any  
differences  between  the  AN-­‐‑WR  or  CN  Groups  or  the  Stress  or  Neutral  Conditions  on  
average  certainty  about  strategy  during  the  WCST.  There  was  a  significant  effect  of  
Group,  F(1,69)  =  7.29,  p  <  .01,  partial  η2  =  .10,  and  Condition,  F(1,69)  =  4.90,  p  <  .05,  partial  
η2  =  .07,  for  WCST  Wrong,  but  the  interaction  term  was  not  significant,  F(1,69)  =  .43,  p  =  
.52,  partial  η2  =  .01.  This  indicates  that  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  (M  =  4.54,  SD  =  2.90)  was  
significantly  less  certain  about  their  WCST  strategy  after  being  told  they  were  “wrong”  
than  the  CN  group  (M  =  6.26,  SD  =  2.81).  Similarly,  participants  who  underwent  a  stress  
induction  (M  =  4.69,  SD  =  2.79)  were  significantly  less  certain  after  being  told  they  were  
“wrong”  than  individuals  who  were  in  the  Neutral  condition  (M  =  6.26,  SD  =  2.81).  There  
was  a  significant  effect  of  Group,  F(1,69)  =  9.46,  p  <  .01,  partial  η2  =  .12,  but  not  a  
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significant  effect  of  Condition,  F(1,69)  =  .39,  p  =  .53,  partial  η2  =  .01,  or  interaction  of  the  
two,  F(1,69)  =  .58,  p  =  .45,  partial  η2  =  .01,  for  WCST  Uncertainty.  This  indicates  that  the  
AN-­‐‑WR  group  (M  =  5.24,  SD  =  2.51)  experienced  a  greater  level  of  uncertainty  during  the  
WCST  task  than  the  CN  group  (M  =  3.35,  SD  =  2.67),  but  that  undergoing  a  stress  
induction  did  not  impact  degree  of  uncertainty.    
  
Table  8:  WCST  Uncertainty  
a = groups significantly differed with a p < 0.05; b = groups significantly differed with p < 0.01; c = groups 
significantly differed with a p < 0.001 
  
 WCST Certainty WCST Wrong WCST Uncertainty 
          Mean (SD)          Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
    AN-WR Neutral (n = 19) 7.30 (1.68)          5.02 (2.76)            5.28 (2.65) 
AN-WR Stress (n = 17) 7.16 (2.69)          4.02 (2.75)            5.20 (2.42) 
    
CN Neutral (n = 19)          8.41 (1.56)          7.15 (2.64)            2.92 (2.52) 
CN Stress (n = 18)          7.46 (2.26)          5.33 (2.74)            5.20 (2.42) 
    
AN-WR Group (n = 36)          7.23 (2.18)          4.54 (2.90) b            5.24 (2.51) b 
CN Group (n = 37)          7.95 (1.96)          6.26 (2.81) b            3.35 (2.67) b 
    
Neutral Condition (n = 38)          7.85 (1.70)          6.26 (2.81) a           4.13 (2.82) 
Stress Condition (n = 35)          7.32 (2.45)          4.69 (2.79) a           4.47 (2.69) 
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4.6.2 Associations between RGB and WCST Uncertainty  
Bivariate  correlation  analyses  stratified  by  group  (AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN)  were  
conducted  to  test  the  associations  between  uncertainty  ratings  related  to  WCST  
performance  (WCST  Certainty  –  higher  scores  reflect  greater  levels  of  certainty;  WCST  
Wrong  –  higher  scores  reflect  greater  levels  of  certainty  after  being  told  you  were  
“wrong”;  WCST  Uncertainty  –  higher  scores  reflect  a  greater  degree  of  uncertainty  
experienced  during  the  task)  and  RGB  outcomes  (WCST  scores,  with  the  exception  of  
Categories  Completed).  Analyses  were  run  on  logarithmic  transformed  variables  when  
raw  scores  were  not  normally  distributed  and  with  outliers  excluded.  
4.6.2.1  Acquisition  
No  significant  associations  between  degree  of  uncertainty  during  the  WCST  
(WCST  Certainty,  WCST  Wrong,  WCST  Uncertainty)  and  rate  of  acquisition  (Rule  Rate  
and  Number  of  Trials  to  Complete  First  Category)  were  found  in  the  CN  group.  
Similarly,  there  were  no  significant  relationships  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  with  the  
exception  of  the  association  between  Rule  Rate  and  WCST  Certainty,  r  =  -­‐‑.36,  n  =  35,  p  <  
.05.  This  indicates  that  greater  levels  of  certainty  during  the  WCST  task  were  associated  
with  faster  acquisition  of  a  correct  rule  only  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group.  
4.6.2.2  Extinction  
Analyses  assessing  the  relationship  between  WCST  Certainty  and  extinction  
outcomes  (i.e.,  rule-­‐‑based  insensitivity)  in  the  CN  Group  indicated  that  greater  levels  of  
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certainty  was  associated  with  fewer  Total  Perseverative  Errors,  r  =  -­‐‑.47,  n  =  36,  p  <    .001,  
and  fewer  Total  Perseverative  Errors  After  the  First  Category  Change,  r  =  -­‐‑.41,  n  =  36,  p  <    
.01.  That  is,  greater  degree  of  certainty  related  to  better  extinction  as  evidenced  by  fewer  
perseverative  errors.  Similarly,  results  indicated  that  greater  levels  of  certainty  after  
being  wrong  were  associated  with  fewer  Total  Perseverative  Errors,  r  =  -­‐‑.44,  n  =  36,  p  <    
.01,  and  fewer  Total  Perseverative  Errors  After  the  First  Category  Change,  r  =  -­‐‑.38,  n  =  36,  
p  <    .05,  in  the  CN  group.  There  were  no  significant  relationships  between  WCST  
Uncertainty  and  extinction  outcomes  in  the  CN  group.  Taken  together,  results  indicate  
that  greater  levels  of  certainty  were  associated  with  fewer  perseverative  errors  in  the  CN  
group.    
Analyses  assessing  the  relationship  between  WCST  Certainty,  WCST  Wrong  and  
rule-­‐‑based  insensitivity  outcomes  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  Group  indicated  that  greater  levels  of  
certainty  were  associated  with  fewer  Total  Perseverative  Errors,  (WCST  Certainty:  r  =  -­‐‑
.52,  n  =  35,  p  <    .001;  WCST  Wrong:  r  =  -­‐‑.53,  n  =  36,  p  <    .001).  Additionally,  results  
indicated  that  higher  levels  of  uncertainty  were  associated  with  more  Total  
Perseverative  Errors,  r  =  .54,  n  =  35,  p  <    .001.  No  significant  associations  were  found  
among  certainty  of  strategy  during  the  WCST  and  Total  Perseverative  Errors  After  the  
First  Category  Change  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group.  Results  together  indicate  that  greater  levels  
of  certainty  were  associated  with  fewer  perseverative  errors  and,  likewise,  higher  levels  
of  uncertainty  were  associated  with  more  perseverative  errors  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group.    
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4.6.2.3  Flexibility  
No  significant  associations  between  certainty  during  the  WCST  (WCST  
Certainty,  WCST  Wrong,  WCST  Uncertainty)  and  flexibility  (Total  Correct)  were  found  
in  the  CN  group.  Similarly,  there  were  no  significant  relationships  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  
with  the  exception  of  the  association  between  Total  Correct  and  WCST  Uncertainty,  r  =  
.44,  n  =  36,  p  <  .01.  This  indicates  that  a  greater  level  of  uncertainty  during  the  WCST  task  
was  associated  with  a  greater  number  of  Total  Correct  on  the  WCST  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  
group.  
4.7 RGB and the Presence of Affective Arousal 
4.7.1 Acquisition 
Initially,  a  two-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑subjects  MANCOVA  controlling  for  IQ  was  
planned  to  assess  differences  between  Group  (AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN)  and  Condition  (Stress  
and  Neutral)  on  rule  acquisition  (Rule  Rate  and  Number  of  Cards  to  Complete  First  
Category).  Initial  examination  of  the  data  indicated  univariate  violations  of  normality  on  
both  dependent  variables.  The  dependent  variables  underwent  logarithmic  
transformation  and  two  outliers  were  removed  establishing  adequate  univariate  
normality.  However,  Box’s  Test  of  Equality  of  Covariance  Matrices  was  significant  
indicating  that  the  assumption  of  equal  dependent  variables  covariance  matrices  was  
violated.  Given  this,  a  MANCOVA  was  no  longer  determined  to  be  appropriate  and  
thus  separate  two-­‐‑way  between  subjects  ANCOVAs  were  conducted.    
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A  two-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑subjects  ANCOVA  controlling  for  IQ  was  used  to  analyze  
Rule  Rate  (post  logarithmic  transformation  with  two  outliers  removed)  with  two  levels  
of  Group  (AN  and  CN)  and  two  levels  of  Condition  (Stress  and  Neutral)  as  the  
independent  variables.  No  effects  were  found  to  be  statistically  significant.  More  
specifically,  there  was  not  a  significant  main  effect  of  Condition,  F(1,67)  =  .13,  p  =.72,  
partial  η2  =  .002,  or  Group,  F(1,67)  =  .47,  p  =.50,  partial  η2  =  .007,  and  there  was  not  a  
significant  Condition  X  Group  Interaction,  F(1,67)  =  .132,  p  =.72,  partial  η2  =  .002  (see  
Table  9  for  means  (SD)).      
Table  9:  Acquisition  
a = groups significantly differed with a p < 0.05; b = groups significantly differed with p < 0.01; c =       
groups significantly differed with a p < 0.001 
 WCST Rule Rate WCST # Cards to Complete 
1st Category 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
   AN-WR Neutral (n = 19) 3.84 (1.38) 12.58 (3.34) 
AN-WR Stress (n = 16) 4.06 (1.48) 12.25 (1.88) 
   
CN Neutral (n = 20) 3.45 (0.69) 11.80 (1.82) 
CN Stress (n = 17) 3.71 (0.92) 13.71 (7.25) 
   
AN-WR Group (n = 35) 3.94 (1.41) 12.43 (2.74) 
CN Group (n = 37) 3.57 (0.80) 12.67 (5.10) 
   
Neutral Condition (n = 39) 3.64 (1.09) 12.18 (2.66) 
Stress Condition (n = 33) 3.88 (1.22) 13.00 (5.34) 
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A  two-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑subjects  ANCOVA  controlling  for  IQ  was  used  to  analyze  
Number  of  Cards  to  Complete  First  Category  (post  logarithmic  transformation  with  two  
outliers  removed)  with  two  levels  of  Group  (AN  and  CN)  and  two  levels  of  Condition  
(Stress  and  Neutral)  as  the  independent  variables.  No  effects  were  found  to  be  
statistically  significant.  More  specifically,  there  was  not  a  significant  main  effect  of  
Condition,  F(1,67)  =  .31,  p  =.58,  partial  η2  =  .01,  or  Group,  F(1,67)  =  .03,  p  =.87,  partial  η2  =  
.000,  and  there  was  not  a  significant  Condition  X  Group  Interaction,  F(1,67)  =  .72,  p  =.40,  
partial  η2  =  .01  (see  Table  8  for  means  (SD)).    
Taken  together,  in  contrast  to  what  was  hypothesized,  findings  indicate  that  
stress  did  not  impact  rule  acquisition,  as  operationalized  by  Rule  Rate  and  Number  of  
Cards  to  Complete  First  Category,  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  or  CN  groups.  Additionally,  there  
were  no  differences  between  the  AN-­‐‑WR  or  CN  groups  on  rule  acquisition  outcomes.      
4.7.2 Extinction 
Initially,  a  two-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑subjects  MANCOVA  controlling  for  IQ  was  
planned  to  assess  differences  between  Group  (AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN)  and  Condition  (Stress  
and  Neutral)  on  rule-­‐‑based  insensitivity  (Total  Perseverative  Errors  and  Total  
Perseverative  Errors  after  First  Category  Change).  Initial  examination  of  the  data  
indicated  univariate  violations  of  normality  on  both  dependent  variables.  The  
dependent  variables  underwent  logarithmic  transformation  and  two  outliers  were  
removed  establishing  adequate  univariate  normality.  However,  Box’s  Test  of  Equality  of  
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Covariance  Matrices  was  significant  indicating  that  the  assumption  of  equal  dependent  
variables  covariance  matrices  was  violated.  Given  this,  a  MANCOVA  was  no  longer  
determined  to  be  appropriate  and  thus  separate  two-­‐‑way  between  subjects  ANOVAs  
were  implemented.  
A  two-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑subjects  ANCOVA  controlling  for  IQ  was  instead  selected  to  
analyze  Total  Perseverative  Errors  (post  logarithmic  transformation  with  two  outliers  
removed)  with  two  levels  of  Group  (AN  and  CN)  and  two  levels  of  Condition  (Stress  
and  Neutral)  as  the  independent  variables.  A  significant  main  effect  of  Group  was  
found,  F(1,67)  =  7.33,  p  <  .01,  partial  η2  =  .10,  indicating  that  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  had  more  
Total  Perseverative  Errors  than  the  CN  group  (see  Table  10  for  means  (SD)).  There  was  
not  a  significant  main  effect  of  Condition,  F(1,67)  =  1.47,  p  =.23,  partial  η2  =  .02,  or  
significant  Condition  X  Group  Interaction,  F(1,67)  =  .21,  p  =.65,  partial  η2  =  .003.    
A  two-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑subjects  ANCOVA  controlling  for  IQ  was  used  to  analyze  
Total  Perseverative  Errors  after  First  Category  Change  (post  logarithmic  transformation  
with  two  outliers  removed)  with  two  levels  of  Group  (AN  and  CN)  and  two  levels  of  
Condition  (Stress  and  Neutral)  as  the  independent  variables.  No  effects  were  statistically  
significant.  More  specifically,  there  was  not  a  significant  main  effect  of  Condition,  F(1,66)  
=  0.8,  p  =.80,  partial  η2  =  .001,  or  Group,  F(1,66)  =  3.59,  p  =.06,  partial  η2  =  .05,  and  there  
was  not  a  significant  Condition  X  Group  Interaction,  F(1,66)  =  1.76,  p  =  .19,  partial  η2  =  .03  
(see  Table  10  for  means  (SD)).      
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Taken  together,  in  contrast  to  what  was  hypothesized,  findings  indicate  that  
stress  did  not  impact  the  number  of  perseverative  errors  made  by  the  AN-­‐‑WR  or  CN  
groups.  However,  as  hypothesized,  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  made  a  greater  number  of  
perseverative  errors  throughout  the  task  compared  to  the  CN  group.    
  
Table  10:  Extinction  
a = groups significantly differed with a p < 0.05; b = groups significantly differed with p < 0.01; c =       




 WCST Total Perseverative 
Errors 
WCST Total Perseverative 
Errors after First Category 
Change 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
   AN-WR Neutral (n = 19) 8.12 (3.78) 1.84 (0.96) 
AN-WR Stress (n = 16) 9.00 (5.73) 1.75 (1.57) 
   
CN Neutral (n = 20) 6.55 (2.14) 1.35 (0.93) 
CN Stress (n = 17) 7.00 (3.87) 1.44 (0.89) 
   
AN-WR Group (n = 35) 9.72 (8.61) b 1.80 (1.26) 
CN Group (n = 37) 6.76 (3.02) b 1.39 (0.90) 
   
Neutral Condition (n = 39) 7.31 (3.11) 1.59 (0.97) 
Stress Condition (n = 33) 9.26 (8.96) 1.59 (1.23) 
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4.7.3 Flexibility 
Initially,  a  two-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑subjects  MANCOVA  controlling  for  IQ  was  
planned  to  assess  differences  between  Group  (AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN)  and  Condition  (Stress  
and  Neutral)  on  flexible  rule-­‐‑following  (Total  Correct  and  Number  of  Categories  
Completed).  Initial  examination  of  the  data  indicated  univariate  violations  of  normality  
on  both  dependent  variables.  Additionally,  visual  analysis  of  the  Number  of  Categories  
Completed  dependent  variable  indicated  insufficient  variability  with  94.60%  of  the  
sample  (70  of  74  individuals)  completing  all  6  six  categories.  The  dependent  variables  
underwent  logarithmic  transformation  and  one  outlier  was  removed.  This  resulted  in  
adequate  normality  for  Total  Correct  but  the  Number  of  Categories  Completed  failed  to  
reach  acceptable  normality  as  expected.  Given  this,  a  MANCOVA  was  no  longer  
determined  to  be  appropriate.    
A  two-­‐‑way  between-­‐‑subjects  ANCOVA  controlling  for  IQ  was  selected  to  
analyze  Total  Correct  (post  logarithmic  transformation  with  one  outlier  removed)  with  
two  levels  of  Group  (AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN)  and  two  levels  of  Condition  (Stress  and  Neutral)  
as  the  independent  variables.  A  significant  main  effect  of  Group  was  found,  F(1,68)  =  
5.18,  p  <  .05,  partial  η2  =  .07,  indicating  that  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  scored  significantly  higher  
on  Total  Correct  than  the  CN  group  (see  Table  11  for  means  (SD)).  There  was  not  a  
significant  main  effect  of  Condition,  F(1,68)  =  .62,  p  =.44,  partial  η2  =  .01,  or  significant  
Condition  X  Group  Interaction,  F(1,68)  =  1.56,  p  =.22,  partial  η2  =  .02.  In  contrast  to  what  
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was  hypothesized,  findings  indicate  that  stress  did  not  impact  flexible  rule-­‐‑following  as  
defined  by  Total  Correct.  Additionally,  contrary  to  what  was  expected,  the  AN-­‐‑WR  
group  scored  significantly  higher  on  Total  Correct  than  the  CN  group.    
  
Table  11:  Flexibility  
      WCST Total Correct 
 Mean (SD) 
  AN-WR Neutral (n = 19) 71.05 (6.45) 
AN-WR Stress (n = 16) 70.53 (8.74) 
  
CN Neutral (n = 20) 66.10 (4.18) 
CN Stress (n = 17) 68.71 (6.31) 
  
AN-WR Group (n = 35) 70.81 (7.51) a 
CN Group (n = 37) 67.39 (5.35) a 
  
Neutral Condition (n = 39) 68.62 (5.89) 
Stress Condition (n = 33) 69.62 (7.57) 
    a = groups significantly differed with a p < 0.05; b = groups  
  significantly differed with p < 0.01; c = groups significantly differed 
  with a p < 0.001 
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5. Discussion 
Individuals  with  AN  relentlessly  persist  in  dangerous  behaviors  even  in  the  
presence  of  deleterious  health  outcomes.  Such  rigidity  predates  illness  onset,  continues  
post  recovery,  and  contributes  to  high  rates  of  morbidity  and  mortality  (Strober,  1980;  
Tchanturia  et  al.,  2004;  Keel  et  al.,  2003).  Despite  this,  our  knowledge  of  factors  that  lead  
to  the  development  and  maintenance  of  rigidity  is  lacking.  This  paper  proposed  that  
rigidity  may  be  formulated  as  maladaptive  RGB  in  AN  that  emerges  in  situations  of  
uncertainty  and  inhibits  contingency-­‐‑based  learning  which  would  establish  more  
adaptive  responses.  The  current  study  examined  parts  of  this  model  in  the  following  
ways:  1)  Determining  whether  there  are  group  differences  between  individuals  weight-­‐‑  
recovered  from  AN  and  healthy  controls  in  their  intolerance  of  uncertainty  and  ability  to  
regulate  emotion  and  exploring  whether  these  variables  are  related  to  RGB  parameters;  
2)  Comparing  degree  of  uncertainty  reported  between  AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN  groups  during  a  
rule-­‐‑following  task  and  exploring  the  relationship  to  rule-­‐‑governed  parameters;  3)  
characterizing  RGB  in  individuals  recovered  from  AN  relative  to  healthy  controls  and  
exploring  how  these  behaviors  change  in  the  presence  of  affective  arousal,  a  presumed  
state  of  uncertainty  and  loss  of  control  in  AN.  Findings  from  the  current  study  provide  
tentative  support  for  this  model  which  will  be  discussed  in  detail  below.    
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5.1 RGB and Difficulties with Uncertainty and Emotion 
Regulation 
To  date,  little  attention  has  been  given  to  factors  that  may  promote  rigidity  in  
AN.  Previous  research  has  shown  associations  between  behaviors  that  can  be  
formulated  as  rule-­‐‑based  insensitivity  and  anxiety  and  depression  in  AN  (Giel  et  al.,  
2012;  Roberts  et  al.,  2010),  although  the  current  study  did  not  replicate  these  findings.  
The  current  study  sought  to  extend  this  work  by  examining  other  factors  thought  to  
promote  maladaptive  RGB  in  AN.      
Our  proposed  model  suggested  that  maladaptive  RGB  would  be  related  to  an  
intolerance  of  uncertainty  and  difficulties  with  emotion  regulation  among  individuals  
with  AN.  We  therefore  hypothesized  that  individuals  with  AN  would  report  greater  
difficulties  with  uncertainty  and  emotion  regulation  and  that  these  difficulties  would  be  
associated  with  RGB  parameters.  As  expected,  individuals  with  AN  reported  a  greater  
general  intolerance  of  uncertainty  and  difficulties  with  emotion  regulation.  These  results  
add  to  the  broader  literature  showing  that  individuals  with  AN  continue  to  struggle  
with  uncertainty  and  emotion  regulation  post  weight  restoration.  Furthermore,  the  
general  fear  of  uncertainty  was  associated  with  outcomes  suggesting  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  
evidenced  increased  rule-­‐‑based  insensitivity.  This  provides  support  for  the  model  
indicating  that  broad  difficulties  with  uncertainty  are  related  to  a  reliance  on  RGB  and  
thus  rule-­‐‑based  insensitivity.    
     73  
  
In  contrast  to  what  was  expected,  however,  emotion  regulation  capacity  was  not  
associated  with  RGB.  This  may  suggest  that  RGB  is  not  related  to  the  ability  to  regulate  
emotion  and  therefore  does  not  support  the  hypothesis  that  RGB  is  used  as  an  emotion  
regulation  strategy  among  individuals  with  AN.  However,  it  is  also  possible  that  RGB  is  
related  to  specific  deficits  in  emotion  regulation,  such  as  a  limited  access  to  emotion  
regulation  strategies,  rather  than  general  difficulties.  Future  research  is  needed  to  
further  clarify  this  relationship.    
5.2 RGB and WCST Uncertainty 
The  proposed  model  suggests  that  RGB  emerges  in  contexts  of  uncertainty.  
Given  the  ambiguous  nature  of  the  WCST,  we  hypothesized  that  individuals  with  AN  
would  report  lower  levels  of  certainty  and  higher  levels  of  uncertainty  during  the  WCST  
and  that  uncertainty  would  be  related  to  RGB  outcome.  Findings  partially  supported  
these  hypotheses  as  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  reported  greater  levels  of  uncertainty  and  less  
certainty  during  the  WCST  and  degree  of  uncertainty  was  related  to  maladaptive  RGB  in  
the  AN-­‐‑WR  group.  More  specifically,  greater  levels  of  certainty  during  the  WCST  were  
associated  with  fewer  perseverative  errors  and,  likewise,  greater  levels  of  uncertainty  
were  related  to  more  perseverative  errors  or  rule-­‐‑based  insensitivity.  Taken  together,  
findings  suggest  that  uncertainty  is  related  to  a  reliance  on  RGB  and  thus  rule-­‐‑based  
insensitivity  in  AN,  which  would  provide  tentative  support  for  the  model.    
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Interestingly,  degree  of  certainty  was  associated  with  faster  acquisition  whereas  
degree  of  uncertainty  was  associated  with  greater  levels  of  rule  flexibility  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  
group.  It  is  unclear  how  to  interpret  these  findings.  That  greater  levels  of  certainty  were  
associated  with  faster  acquisition  may  be  a  result  of  the  questions  being  asked  after  task  
completion.  That  is,  those  who  were  initially  more  successful  might  have  later  reported  
greater  levels  of  certainty.  It  seems  unlikely,  however,  that  actual  performance  on  the  
WCST  would  be  driving  the  relationship  between  uncertainty  and  flexibility  given  
greater  levels  of  uncertainty  were  associated  with  better  rather  than  worse  performance.  
A  more  plausible  explanation  is  that  uncertainty  during  the  task  motivated  the  use  of  
rules  as  a  strategy,  which  was  ultimately  successful  for  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group.    
Importantly,  findings  need  to  be  interpreted  with  caution.  Questions  were  asked  
after  task  completion  and  thus  may  have  been  influenced  by  performance.  Additionally,  
findings  are  only  correlational  and  thus  direction  cannot  be  established  and  
relationships  may  be  explained  by  additional  variables.  In  light  of  these  limitations,  
however,  results  suggest  that  uncertainty  is  related  to  RBG  outcomes  in  AN.  This  
provides  preliminary  support  that  maladaptive  RGB  is  likely  to  occur  during  states  of  
uncertainty.      
5.3 RGB in AN 
Consistent  with  the  phenomenology  of  AN,  we  proposed  that  those  with  AN  are  
overly  reliant  on  rules  to  guide  behavior  and  thus  have  difficulty  or  are  unwilling  to  use  
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environmental  feedback  to  guide  behavior.  We  chose  to  examine  RGB  in  a  sample  of  
individuals  weight-­‐‑recovered  from  AN  to  parse  out  the  impact  of  malnutrition  on  
outcomes.  Study  findings  indicate  some  significant  differences  between  AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN  
groups,  irrespective  of  whether  a  negative  mood  was  induced,  on  some  but  not  all  RGB  
parameters.    
First,  we  predicted  that  those  with  AN  would  demonstrate  a  faster  rate  of  
acquisition  of  rule-­‐‑based  behavior,  perhaps  as  a  function  of  their  excessive  reliance  on  
this  strategy.  In  contrast  to  what  was  hypothesized,  no  differences  were  found  between  
the  AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN  groups.  This  potentially  indicates  that  individuals  with  AN  do  not  
exhibit  faster  rates  of  acquisition  as  was  expected.  It  is  also  possible,  however,  that  the  
WCST  was  not  sensitive  enough  to  detect  such  differences.  While  not  directly  stated  to  
the  participant,  the  WCST  requires  individuals  to  sort  cards  based  on  three  main  
variables  (i.e.,  color,  shape,  and  number).  Although  it  is  possible  that  other  rules  can  be  
inaccurately  derived,  results  indicated  that  most  individuals  identified  the  first  correct  
sorting  rule  within  three  attempts  at  sorting  the  cards.  That  is,  participants  on  average  
received  feedback  that  their  strategy  was  “wrong”  two  times  before  they  received  
feedback  that  their  strategy  was  “right.”  It  is  therefore  likely  that  the  participants  of  the  
current  study  quickly  identified  the  three  different  ways  to  sort  the  cards  and  then  
strategically  implemented  each  of  these  possible  rules  until  they  received  feedback  that  
the  rule  was  in  fact  correct.  The  implementation  and  successfulness  of  this  strategy  is  
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likely  reflective  of  the  high  sample  IQ.  Other  laboratory  tasks  that  allow  for  a  variety  of  
response  patterns  (see  review  of  RGB  for  task  descriptions)  may  demonstrate  differences  
in  acquisition  between  AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN  groups  that  the  WCST  was  unable  to  detect.    
Consistent  with  earlier  studies  (e.g.,  Tchanturia  et  al.,  2012;  Roberts  et  al.,  2010;  
Tenconi  et  al.,  2010),  our  model  predicted  that  those  with  AN  would  evidence  a  greater  
number  of  perseverative  errors  indicating  rule-­‐‑based  insensitivity.  As  expected,  the  AN-­‐‑
WR  group  continued  to  sort  cards  based  on  a  previously  successful  rule  when  given  
feedback  it  was  no  longer  working  more  frequently  than  the  CN  group.  This  suggests  
that  the  reliance  on  verbal  rules  to  guide  behavior  during  the  task  led  to  impairments  in  
extinction  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group.  That  is,  while  individuals  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  were  
able  to  successfully  acquire  rules,  the  reliance  on  these  rules  as  a  guide  for  behavior  
negatively  impacted  their  ability  to  incorporate  and  adjust  behavior  in  accordance  with  
feedback.    
Per  the  model,  we  also  predicted  that  individuals  with  AN  would  demonstrate  
overall  impairments  in  rule  flexibility.  Interestingly,  while  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  evidenced  
impairments  in  extinction,  they  demonstrated  greater  overall  rule  flexibility  compared  
to  the  CN  group  as  shown  by  significantly  more  correct  responses  on  the  WCST.  
Importantly,  only  one  study  to  date  has  explored  differences  in  the  total  number  correct  
on  the  WCST  between  individuals  recovered  from  AN  and  healthy  controls  (Tchanturia  
et  al.,  2012).  While  that  study  did  not  find  any  statistical  differences  between  healthy  
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control  and  individuals  recovered  from  AN,  IQ  was  not  reported  or  controlled  for  in  
analyses,  which  may  have  impacted  findings  (Ardila,  Pineda,  &  Rosselli,  2000).  The  
current  study  did  not  find  any  differences  in  total  categories  completed  between  the  
AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN  groups,  as  almost  95%  of  the  sample  completed  all  six  categories.  Only  
a  couple  studies  incorporating  individuals  recovered  from  AN  have  reported  number  of  
categories  completed  (e.g.,  Tenconi  et  al.,  2010;  Tchanturia  et  al.,  2012).  Findings  have  
been  mixed  with  one  study  demonstrating  no  significant  differences  between  
individuals  recovered  from  AN  and  healthy  controls  (Tchanturia  et  al.,  2012),  and  the  
other  showing  fewer  categories  completed  than  healthy  controls  (Tenconi  et  al.,  2010).  
Importantly,  neither  study  reported  or  covaried  for  IQ.    
This  study  is  therefore  the  first  to  demonstrate  greater  rule  flexibility  among  
individuals  recovered  from  AN  compared  to  healthy  controls.  This  suggests  that  the  
reliance  on  rules  to  guide  behavior  was  overall  an  adaptive  strategy.  While  not  initially  
hypothesized,  such  findings  are  not  surprising  given  rule-­‐‑following  is  proposed  to  be  a  
strategy  that  individuals  with  AN  rely  on  because  it  has  resulted  in  successful  outcomes  
in  the  past.  If  this  strategy  was  not  successful,  then  it  would  have  been  abandoned.  The  
rules  formulated  throughout  the  WCST  task  were  reinforced  and  were  thus  adhered  to,  
which  likely  helped  these  individuals  maintain  more  adaptive  behavior  throughout  the  
task.  Additionally,  individuals  with  AN  have  been  shown  to  be  highly  sensitive  to  harm  
and  punishment  (Cassin  &  von  Ranson,  2005;  Fassino  et  al.,  2002).  The  punishment  of  an  
     78  
  
incorrect  response  (i.e.,  feedback  that  the  previously  successful  rule  was  now  “wrong”)  
may  have  been  a  more  aversive  experience  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group.  Individuals  in  the  AN-­‐‑
WR  group  may  have  been  more  motivated  to  avoid  the  negative  experience  associated  
with  incorrect  responses  and  thus  were  more  adept  at  developing  and  adhering  to  rules  
than  individuals  in  the  CN  group.    
Taken  together,  findings  indicate  that  individuals  with  AN  relied  on  rules  to  
guide  their  behavior  and  that  this  strategy  was  ultimately  successful.  Such  success,  
although  not  hypothesized,  supports  the  proposed  model  as  it  provides  evidence  of  the  
potentially  reinforcing  nature  of  rule-­‐‑following  in  AN  (i.e.,  it  works).  However,  this  
strategy  becomes  problematic  when  environmental  contingencies  change.  The  reliance  
on  rules  led  to  feedback  insensitivity  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group.  While  this  was  not  
problematic  in  the  laboratory  task,  as  it  did  not  impair  overall  performance,  such  
insensitivity  may  explain  the  dire  consequences  that  occur  with  the  rigid  persistence  of  
behavioral  symptoms  seen  in  AN.  That  is,  the  adherence  to  RGB  provides  one  way  to  
understand  why  individuals  with  AN  continue  to  engage  in  restrictive  eating  patterns  or  
follow  extreme  exercise  regimens,  for  example,  even  when  they  encounter  negative  
health  consequences.  
5.4 RGB and Affective Arousal 
We  proposed  that  RGB  in  AN  occurs  in  situations  of  uncertainty  or  a  loss  of  
control,  such  as  in  the  presence  of  affective  arousal.  We  therefore  expected  that  
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individuals  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  randomized  to  the  Stress  condition  would  experience  
greater  levels  of  uncertainty  during  the  WCST  task  and  would  evidence  faster  rates  of  
acquisition  but  impaired  extinction  and  flexibility.  In  contrast  to  what  was  hypothesized,  
levels  of  uncertainty  did  not  differ  between  the  AN-­‐‑WR  Stress  or  Neutral  groups,  with  
the  exception  that  all  participants  randomized  to  the  Stress  Condition  reported  feeling  
less  certain  about  their  WCST  strategy  after  being  told  they  were  wrong.  Additionally,  
the  presence  of  affective  arousal  did  not  impact  RGB  outcomes  among  the  AN-­‐‑WR  or  
CN  groups.  The  lack  of  findings  in  healthy  control  individuals  is  commensurate  with  the  
small  body  of  work  demonstrating  that  a  negative  mood  induction  does  not  impact  
executive  functioning  among  typical  controls  (Mitchell  &  Phillips,  2007).  That  affective  
arousal  did  not  have  an  impact  on  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  is  in  contrast  to  what  was  
hypothesized.  While  this  suggests  that  affective  arousal  does  not  impact  level  of  
uncertainty  or  RGB  among  individuals  with  AN,  findings  need  to  be  interpreted  with  
caution  as  other  factors  may  have  impacted  the  results.    
A  failure  of  the  mood  induction  to  yield  sufficient  anxiety  may  be  one  factor  that  
contributed  to  a  lack  of  effects  found  in  the  current  study.  A  modified  Trier  Social  Stress  
Test  (Kirschbaum  et  al.,  1993)  was  used  to  manipulate  anxiety  level.  While  this  resulted  
in  a  significant  increase  in  anxiety  scores  from  pre-­‐‑to-­‐‑post  mood  manipulation  
exclusively  in  the  Stress  Condition,  scores  were  still  lower  than  other  studies  before  and  
after  the  mood  manipulation  (see  Spielberger,  1983).  Surprisingly,  the  mean  anxiety  
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score  of  the  Stress  Condition  after  mood  manipulation  in  the  current  study  was  actually  
lower  than  the  state  anxiety  mean  of  a  large  sample  of  female  undergraduate  students  in  
a  neutral  context  (Spielberger,  1983).  While  there  is  significant  laboratory  support  
demonstrating  increased  anxiety  via  self-­‐‑report  and  physiological  measures  using  the  
Trier  Social  Stress  Test  (Hellhammer  &  Schubert,  2012),  self-­‐‑report  ratings  of  the  current  
study  bring  into  question  whether  the  mood  manipulation  was  meaningful  enough  to  
impact  RGB  outcomes,  especially  given  physiological  measurements  were  not  taken.    
The  time  given  to  prepare  for  the  speech  in  the  Stress  Condition  may  also  have  
interfered  with  the  impact  of  the  mood  manipulation  by  inadvertently  attenuating  
anxiety  levels  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group.  Other  physiological  studies  of  the  Trier  Social  Stress  
Test  show  that  anxiety  increases  during  the  speech  preparation  period  (Hellhammer  &  
Schubert,  2012).  However,  this  may  have  actually  had  the  opposite  affect  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  
group.  That  is,  this  time  for  planning  and  establishing  “rules”  for  the  speech  task  may  
have  helped  reinstate  a  sense  of  certainty  and  control  for  individuals  weight-­‐‑recovered  
from  AN.  The  current  study  does  not  allow  for  the  assessment  of  this  as  physiological  
measurements  were  not  taken  and  self-­‐‑reported  anxiety  levels  were  only  collected  after  
the  10-­‐‑minute  period.    
Lastly,  the  uncertainty  of  the  WCST  may  have  made  the  task  stressful  for  all  
participants  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  and  interfered  with  the  expected  potentiation  of  
effects  in  the  presence  of  affective  arousal.  The  WCST  is  ambiguous  as  participants  are  
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not  given  instructions  as  to  how  to  complete  the  task  and  the  task  contingencies  change  
throughout  the  task.  This  may  have  in  itself  induced  anxiety  among  individuals  with  
AN.  As  such,  there  may  be  a  ceiling  effect  in  that  greater  levels  of  affective  arousal  
beyond  that  produced  by  the  task  it  itself  does  not  have  any  additional  effect  on  RGB.  
The  current  study  did  not  assess  RGB  in  a  predictable  context  and  thus  the  potential  
confound  of  affective  arousal  present  in  the  WCST  is  an  important  limitation.    
In  summary,  while  results  from  the  current  study  did  not  support  a  model  
suggesting  that  maladaptive  RGB  in  AN  would  intensify  in  presence  of  affective  arousal,  
several  factors  may  have  impacted  results.  Additional  research  using  other  mood  
induction  paradigms  that  allow  for  the  effects  of  uncertainty  and  affective  experience  to  
be  parsed  is  necessary  for  the  model  to  be  accurately  tested.        
5.5 Summary and Limitations 
Taken  together,  results  from  the  current  study  provide  preliminary  support  for  a  
model  formulating  rigidity  in  AN  as  maladaptive  RGB  that  occurs  in  the  presence  of  
uncertainty.  More  specifically,  individuals  with  AN  demonstrated  maladaptive  RGB,  
which  is  best  characterized  by  deficits  in  extinction.  Furthermore,  degree  of  uncertainty  
was  associated  with  RGB  parameters  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  group  suggesting  that  the  presence  
of  uncertainty  is  related  to  an  increase  in  RGB.  However,  a  negative  mood  induction  did  
not  increase  reported  levels  of  uncertainty  or  intensify  maladaptive  RGB  as  expected.  
This  may  indicate  that  RGB  does  not  increase  in  emotional  contexts,  or  alternatively,  a  
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lack  of  finding  may  be  due  to  a  methodological  limitation.  More  specifically,  the  
uncertainty  of  the  laboratory  task  may  have  induced  anxiety,  especially  in  the  AN-­‐‑WR  
group,  and  therefore  blunted  the  effects  of  the  intended  mood  manipulation.  Additional  
research  testing  this  aspect  of  the  model  is  needed  with  methodology  that  parses  the  
effects  of  uncertainty  and  affective  arousal.        
The  findings  of  the  current  study  need  to  be  interpreted  in  light  of  its  limitations.  
First,  although  comparable  to  other  AN  studies,  the  sample  size  was  small.  The  power  
and  thus  ability  to  find  effects  was  limited  and  future  studies  with  larger  sample  sizes  
are  needed.  Additionally,  the  current  study  only  included  individuals  weight-­‐‑recovered  
from  AN.  While  this  adds  to  a  growing  body  of  work  demonstrating  continued  rigidity  
post  recovery,  findings  may  therefore  not  generalize  to  other  stages  of  illness,  especially  
those  actively  ill,  and  additional  research  is  needed.  Third,  using  the  WCST  to  explore  
RGB  may  have  limited  results.  The  WCST  was  selected  so  that  study  findings  could  be  
interpreted  within  the  broader  research  on  rigidity.  However,  as  previously  described,  
the  WCST  may  not  be  as  sensitive  to  differences  in  RGB  as  other  tasks  and  thus  actual  
differences  between  the  AN-­‐‑WR  and  CN  groups  may  not  have  been  detected  (e.g.,  
differences  in  acquisition).  Furthermore,  the  uncertainty  inherently  present  in  the  WCST  
may  have  induced  anxiety  and  thus  prevented  a  true  investigation  of  RGB  in  the  
presence  of  affective  arousal  compared  to  RGB  in  a  neutral  state.  It  will  be  important  for  
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future  studies  to  use  alternative  laboratory  tasks  to  perhaps  more  accurately  capture  
RGB  in  AN  and  the  influence  of  affective  arousal.    
5.6 Implications for Treatment 
While  the  replication  of  study  results  is  needed  along  with  assessment  in  
individuals  in  the  acute  stage  of  illness,  findings  from  the  current  study  have  important  
applications  for  the  development  of  novel  treatments.  The  current  study  suggests  that  a  
general  difficulty  tolerating  uncertainty  is  associated  with  rigidity  in  AN  and  that  
maladaptive  RGB  is  associated  with  greater  levels  of  uncertainty.  Treatments  that  target  
how  individuals  with  AN  respond  to  uncertainty,  such  as  by  increasing  acceptance  of  
this  distressing  state  and  promoting  alternative  healthy  and  adaptive  strategies  outside  
of  a  reliance  on  RGB,  may  therefore  improve  treatment  outcomes  for  individuals  with  
AN.  For  example,  in  addition  to  targeting  weight  and  shape  concerns  directly,  findings  
suggest  that  individuals  with  AN  need  help  coping  with  the  uncertainty  associated  with  
using  bodily  cues  to  guide  healthy  eating.  Similarly,  findings  suggest  that  treatments  
targeting  cognitive  flexibility  among  individuals  with  AN  would  benefit  from  extending  
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6. Conclusion 
AN  is  a  deadly  disease  characterized  by  unrelenting  rigidity.  Understanding  
factors  that  promote  and  maintain  rigidity  may  guide  novel  treatments  for  this  
dangerous  disorder  with  a  poverty  of  effective  treatments  for  adults  (Bodell  &  Keel,  
2010).  The  current  paper  proposed  a  model  suggesting  that  rigidity  in  AN  can  be  
formulated  as  maladaptive  RGB  that  emerges  in  contexts  of  uncertainty  and/or  loss  of  
control.    
As  expected,  individuals  with  AN  demonstrated  maladaptive  RGB  best  
characterized  by  problematic  extinction.  Furthermore,  results  lend  support  for  the  
argument  that  maladaptive  RGB  is  related  to  difficulties  tolerating  uncertainty,  both  
generally  as  a  trait  feature  along  with  uncertainty  during  the  task  at  hand.  These  
significant  relationships,  while  only  correlational  at  this  point,  provide  preliminary  
evidence  that  difficulties  with  uncertainty  may  lead  to  the  reliance  of  RGB  as  a  strategy.  
Findings  did  not  support  the  hypothesis  that  maladaptive  RGB  would  increase  in  the  
presence  of  affective  arousal;  however,  limitations  in  the  study  design  indicate  that  this  
should  be  interpreted  with  great  caution  and  future  research  is  needed  using  different  
methodology.  
  Findings  suggest  that  individuals  with  AN  may  rely  on  RGB  as  it  is  overall  a  
successful  strategy.  However,  this  strategy  comes  at  the  cost  of  increased  rule-­‐‑based  
insensitivity.  While  the  consequence  of  rule-­‐‑based  insensitivity  was  relatively  benign  
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during  the  WCST,  the  reliance  on  RGB  may  explain  the  insensitivity  to  the  dire  health  
consequences  that  occur  when  these  individuals  persist  in  the  deadly  eating  disordered  
behaviors  (e.g.,  extreme  and  dangerous  dietary  and  exercise  rules).    
In  sum,  study  findings  provide  preliminary  support  for  using  the  frame  of  
maladaptive  RGB  as  an  explanatory  model  of  rigidity  in  AN  that  occurs  in  the  presence  
of  uncertainty.  This  extends  the  current  knowledge  of  perseverative  behaviors  in  AN  by  
suggesting  that  rigidity  is  impacted  by  additional  factors  such  as  an  intolerance  of  
uncertainty.  Although  additional  research  and  replication  of  study  findings  are  
necessary,  results  have  direct  and  important  implications  for  treatment  development  
and  suggest  that  targeting  difficulties  with  uncertainty  may  be  a  key  component  
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